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FOREWORD
Twenty-five years after al-Qaeda’s founding,
countering al-Qaeda radicalization and recruitment
remains a key U.S. Government (USG) strategic objective. Al-Qaeda proclaims itself the true Islamic
vanguard seeking to overthrow alleged anti-Muslim
apostate governments throughout the Arab Muslim
world. Conducting spectacular, carefully orchestrated anti-Western mass casualty terrorist attacks
as a component of a broader pan-Sunni Islamist insurgent strategy, al-Qaeda deftly employs insidious
propaganda. This propaganda creates Manichean
alternatives—“The Crusader-Zionist War Against Islam” versus “The Vanguard Defender of the Muslim
Umma”—that have not been decisively discredited
despite a barrenness in fact. An underground of selfradicalizing individuals and small cliques incited by
al-Qaeda agitation propaganda now also occupies the
attention of the intelligence and criminal justice sectors of virtually every Western nation.
USG officials charged with counterterrorist messaging have yet to effectively counter al-Qaeda’s information warfare. The reasons for this, and a proposed
methodology for rectifying it, are the core themes of
Dr. Paul Kamolnick’s monograph. First, he argues that
we have failed as a nation to realize fully that deeds
are the most potent communication. Second, that
many of our policies, actions, and deeds incite anger,
moral indignation, outrage, and even hate in regions
of the Arab and Muslim world most vulnerable to our
nation’s least palatable foreign and military policies.
This failure to view the world through Arab and Muslim eyes, Kamolnick asserts, has enabled al-Qaeda’s
sophisticated insurgent propaganda to successfully
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rationalize a violent strategy to assault what it alleges
are those apostate pillars enabling Western hegemony
in its Crusader War against a besieged and oppressed
Muslim faith. Third, Kamolnick provides a highly
critical review of several official reports and analyses
proposing various remedial messaging strategies to
“Sell America to a Westernized secular elite.” It is unlikely, he argues, that U.S. credibility in the Arab and
Muslim world can be enhanced through diplomatic
spin, empty platitudes, vague pronouncements, or
in his words, “putting lipstick on pigs.” This strategy
he claims, whether disingenuous or simply unimaginative, has failed and will to continue do so.
The USG’s substantial credibility deficit is the
proximate cause enabling al-Qaeda’s information
warfare advantage. Kamolnick’s counterintuitive
conclusion, however, is that, while the USG does
maintain certain questionable alliances, exhibit a penchant for regime stability, and maintain a strategy of
forward deployment in defense of vital energy corridors—succinctly summarized by him as “oil, Israel,
and autocracy”—al-Qaeda can produce no evidence
that the USG in deeds, policies, or actions is a religious
Crusader bent on extirpating Islam. Indeed, authoritative polling suggests substantial majorities in the Arab
and Muslim world highly rank many core American
values and distinguish between overall favorable attitudes toward America and Americans, and often
vehement opposition to certain American foreign and
military policies. Moreover, highly reputed militant
Islamists are on record stating that U.S. strategic interests do not preclude seeking and finding common
ground on a range of key issues of great concern to the
Islamic world.
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Having made the case for taking USG deeds seriously, Kamolnick shifts to proposing and outlining
a methodology for leveraging the power of deeds
against al-Qaeda. He first offers a conceptualization
of adversary propaganda as a component of what he
calls the insurgent “terrorist quadrangle” comprising political objectives, terrorist propaganda, terrorist
actions, and strategic objectives. He then provides a
detailed outline of those core themes and messages
which, if systematically organized in a coherent sustained information counteroffensive, undermine alQaeda’s case for employing terroristic violence. Key
to this campaign is that al-Qaeda’s own deeds serve
as the most damning evidence of its actual status as a
criminal terrorist organization waging a self-declared
offensive war to impose its will through terror on
all—Muslim and non-Muslim—who disagree. Specifically, al-Qaeda’s perfidious methods, terroristic modus operandi, and responsibility for besmirching the
Islamic Call, prove that it forsakes the shari’a of lawful jihad and is guilty of the commission of major sins
in Islam; undermines Islamic and Muslim interests;
and that its signature methods of coercion, force, and
fear deny the rightful autonomy of persons—Muslim
and non-Muslim—to exercise essential political and
civil rights.
Why a War of Deeds conceived in the manner
Kamolnick suggests has not been operationalized in
official USG strategy is puzzling. If he is right, it certainly does appear that al-Qaeda’s center of gravity as
self-proclaimed vanguard and defender of a besieged
Umma is vulnerable to frontal assault by the powers of reason, fact, and the evidence of deeds. This
monograph provides much food for thought. Though
provocative and in places possibly controversial, its
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argument deserves the serious attention of USG personnel tasked with conceptualizing and executing an
effective information warfare strategy to counter this
lethal adversary.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qaeda-based, affiliated, and inspired terrorism
is the declared policy of the U.S. Government (USG).
Despite noteworthy success in attacking the al-Qaeda
(AQ) terrorist network and securing the homeland
from terrorist attack, the United States has yet to execute an effective methodology for countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ. This monograph
proposes a distinct War of Deeds methodology for
accomplishing this.
A War of Deeds is to be fought on two interrelated
fronts: changing deeds and challenging deeds. Changing deeds requires a frank examination and possible
reorienting of those present-day USG foreign, military,
and diplomatic policies that diminish USG credibility
and potentially enhance the resonance of AQ’s terrorist propaganda in the Muslim world. It also requires a
frank examination of existing USG information operations that in the opinion of the present writer fail to
adequately address the present U.S. credibility deficit
and whose proposals too often amount to unpersuasive marketing endeavors pitched to a highly selective
Westernized audience.
Challenging deeds involves systematically, comprehensively, and forcefully countering AQ’s terrorist propaganda, fabrications, and disinformation with
verifiable facts. First, I undertake a careful analysis
of the nature and function of propaganda in terrorist operations. I demonstrate the vital importance of
AQ propaganda through the use of a proposed analytic construct—a “terrorist quadrangle”—linking political objectives, terrorist propaganda, terrorist acts,
and strategic objectives; characterize the critical role
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and function of counterpropaganda in information
warfare; and contrast counterpropaganda, as here
defined, with current definitions of psychological
operations (PSYOP) or military information support
operations (MISO).
Next, I offer a comprehensive interpretation of
influence operations, and a broadened conception of
the nature of contemporary war and warfare. Here
departing from the conventional seven instruments
of national power captured by the Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence
and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) or Military, Information/Intelligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastructure, Finance, and Economic (MIDLIFE) acronyms,
I advance a new acronym, DICEFILM (Diplomatic,
Informational, Cyber, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Legal, Military), which explicitly incorporates
the cyber dimension of warfare, increasing to eight
the instruments of national power. After providing
this broadened conception of influence operations,
contemporary warfare, and instruments of national
power, I outline and illustrate the War of Deeds methodology for countering AQ’s messengers, media, and
message; and demonstrate how this methodology
may be used to counter the two “great lies” authorizing AQ’s terrorist modus operandi, i.e., that the USG
is an implacable foe and declared enemy of Islam and
the greater Muslim world (“The Crusader”), and that
al-Qaeda is fighting a purely defensive jihad on behalf
of the oppressed worldwide Muslim faith community
(“The Defender”).
Following a brief conclusion, select strategic considerations are examined with focus especially on the
potential suitability, acceptability, and risks accompanying a proposed War of Deeds.

xii

COUNTERING RADICALIZATION AND
RECRUITMENT TO AL-QAEDA:
FIGHTING THE WAR OF DEEDS
In the propaganda pioneered by al-Qaeda, terrorism is
merely self-defense against a perceived American war
on Islam. There has been no more stark statement of
this belief than the courtroom declarations of Mr. Faisal Shahzad as he pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to life without parole for the failed bombing in Times
Square, New York. Calling himself a ‘Muslim soldier,’
Mr. Shahzad denounced the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq and drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. The
drones, he said, ‘kill women, children, they kill everybody. . . . It’s a war, and in war, they kill people,’ he
added. ‘They’re killing all Muslims.’1
				Scott Shane
				April 2013
We will continue to make it clear that the United States
is not—and never will be—at war with Islam. We
will focus on al-Qaeda’s ability to project its message
across a range of media, challenge the legitimacy and
accuracy of the assertions and behavior it advances,
and promote a greater understanding of U.S. policies
and actions and an alternative to al-Qaeda’s vision.
We also will seek to amplify positive and influential
messages that undermine the legitimacy of al-Qaeda’s
and its actions and contest its worldview. In some cases, we may convey our ideas and messages through
person-to-person engagement, other times through
the power of social media, and in every case through
the message of our deeds.2
			
Barack H. Obama
			
President of the United States
			June 2011

1

The arrest or death of existing terrorists will be only
a short-term success if al-Qaeda continues to recruit,
indoctrinate, and train new members successfully. The
U.S. Government must therefore determine how it can
dissuade new recruits from joining al-Qaeda, as well
as discourage individuals from providing the terrorist
organization financial and other support.3
			
Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr
			2005

INTRODUCTION
In a previous monograph, the author proposed a
distinct “jihad realist” approach for countering radicalization and recruitment to al-Qaeda (AQ).4 It was
argued that the military jihad is, and remains, a binding religious imperative for militant Islamists; a classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh al-jihad) regulates the
waging of this military jihad; AQ’s anti-American
mass casualty terrorism substantially violates this jurisprudence; and that this orthodox classical Sunnite
fiqh al-jihad can, and should, be leveraged to delegitimize AQ: especially among that sliver of recruits for
whom upholding the shari’a is paramount, and the
avoidance of major sins is a moral imperative.
The present monograph proposes a “War of
Deeds” to supplement the author’s jihad-realist approach. Its intended target audience comprises many
different types of morally outraged potential recruits
influenced by AQ’s terrorist propaganda that (self-)
radicalize and (self-) recruit to “homegrown” and
“home-based” terrorism or foreign theaters of conflict.
This War of Deeds is to be fought on two interrelated
fronts: changing deeds and challenging deeds.
Changing deeds requires a frank examination and
possible reorienting of those present-day U.S. Govern2

ment (USG) foreign, military, and diplomatic policies
that diminish USG credibility in the Muslim world,
and also potentially enhance the resonance of AQ’s
terrorist propaganda.
Challenging deeds involves systematically, comprehensively, and forcefully countering AQ’s terrorist propaganda, fabrications, and disinformation with
verifiable facts.
A key premise of the present monograph is that,
despite recognition that USG policies and actions are
key drivers of attitudes and perceptions in the wider
Muslim world, this recognition of deeds as communication has yet to inform sufficiently present terrorist countermessaging strategy. To put it another
way, if what we do matters far more than what we
say, or what we say about what we do; if policies and
actions speak far louder than words; if actions, not
platitudes, signify definitive proof of one’s motives;
then, this premise is neither fully acknowledged nor
systematically exploited in USG information warfare
designed to counter and delegitimize AQ’s terrorist
propaganda.
That the USG need not be beyond moral reproach
or innocent of superpower capacities, interests, or
behaviors, is a second, albeit counterintuitive, premise, anchoring the present argument. Ironically, this
makes a systematic War of Deeds a more productive
and candid endeavor. How so? USG veracity, credibility, and not moral perfection of motives or deeds
is key. The USG’s dirtiest laundry discloses at worst
that it engages in superpower realpolitik, privileges
specific alliances, and defends what it perceives to be
its vital strategic interests in an imperfect world using
imperfect means. Evidence does not support a case
however, even remotely, that the USG is leading or
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fomenting a Crusader alliance against Islam. Yes, one
can discover evidence for genuine tractable clashes of
interests, intra-civilizational fault lines over religion
and state, and even inter-civilizational dialogue and
conflict; however, again, there is no credible evidence
of a Crusader War against Islam or any systematic
animus directed against Islam or Muslims in general.
I have said nothing of the USG’s cleaner laundry, and
there is much of it. I have said nothing of AQ’s dirtiest
laundry, and there is much of that, described in appropriate context as the argument unfolds. A detailed
outline of the argument follows.
First, data is reviewed confirming AQ’s continuing resilience, and also noting progress, or lack thereof, toward accomplishing declared USG policy and
its three key strategic objectives outlined in the 9/11
Commission Report (2004). Second, it is asserted that
USG policies, deeds, and actions are communication,
that they affect message resonance in the Arab and
Muslim world, and the two key fronts in a proposed
War of Deeds are identified: changing deeds, and
challenging deeds.
Third, a detailed examination of the first front,
changing deeds, is provided. I first examine select efforts in USG public diplomacy and their relative failure to put “lipstick on pigs.” I assess the unique challenges and opportunities arising from current USG
foreign and military policies. Then I assert the vital
importance of AQ tactical propaganda in relation to
this author’s proposed analytic construct—a “terrorist quadrangle”— linking political objectives, terrorist propaganda, terrorist acts, and strategic objectives;
characterize the critical role and function of counterpropaganda in information warfare. Finally, I contrast
counterpropaganda as here defined, with current definitions of psychological operations (PSYOP).
4

In the remainder of the monograph, I outline,
describe, and defend key elements comprising the
second front: challenging deeds in a USG counterpropaganda counteroffensive against AQ. I begin by
proposing a comprehensive interpretation of influence
operations, and a broadened conception of the nature
of contemporary war and warfare. Second, departing
from the conventional seven instruments of national
power captured by the Diplomatic, Information,
Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law
Enforcement (DIMEFIL) or Military, Information/Intelligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastructure, Finance,
and Economic (MIDLIFE) acronyms, I advance a new
acronym, DICEFILM (Diplomatic, Informational,
Cyber, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Legal, Military) which explicitly incorporates the cyber dimension of warfare, increasing to eight the instruments of
national power.
Third, after providing this broadened conception
of influence operations, contemporary warfare, and
instruments of national power, I assert the primacy of
a War of Deeds for challenging AQ’s terrorist propaganda. I outline and illustrate the War of Deeds methodology for countering AQ’s messengers, media, and
message. I demonstrate how this methodology may
be used to counter the two “great lies” authorizing
AQ’s terrorist modus operandi, i.e., that the USG is an
implacable foe and declared enemy of Islam and the
greater Muslim world (“The Crusader”); and that AQ
is fighting a purely defensive jihad on behalf of the
oppressed worldwide Muslim faith community (“The
Defender”). In conclusion, I summarize the main
themes of the previous argument and offer concrete
suggestions for strategists tasked with countering
radicalization and recruitment to AQ.
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AL QAEDA: AN EVOLVING THREAT, POLICY,
AND STRATEGY
Despite declared USG policy to disrupt, dismantle,
and ultimately defeat AQ,5 AQ and its affiliates, allies,
and those motivated and inspired by its vision, continue to pose a significant threat to American citizens
and U.S. national security. A decade of sanguine declarations and commentary predicting AQ’s decline,
demise, or even strategic defeat6 have been repeatedly upstaged by this resilient and highly adaptive
enemy, and more “bearish” assessments have proven
more reliable.7 AQ’s persistence as a lethal global
threat—despite the May 2, 2011, killing of Osama bin
Laden 8—and the August 2013 USG closure of nearly
two dozen U.S. embassy compounds and worldwide
travel alert,9 furnish additional evidence for this bearish view. In addition, AQ, either directly or more
generally through tactical allies, affiliates, or terrorist
acts carried out in its name is associated with a lethal
swath of global terrorist incidents. In 2011, 11 of the
top 20 most active terrorist groups were linked to AQ.
Together, those groups carried out over 780 attacks,
resulting in 3,000 deaths and more than 4,600 wounded. Further, four of the five most lethal attacks were
linked to an AQ-linked group (AQ in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP], Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, al-Shabaab,
and AQ in Iraq).10 In 2012, six of the top 10 terrorist
perpetrator groups worldwide had at least limited association with AQ’s global insurgent terrorist modus
operandi, conducting 1,470 terrorist attacks, which resulted in 4,938 deaths.11
Recent reports documenting how AQ’s encrypted
cyber communication facilitates transnational terrorist logistics and organization further evidences the
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adaptive capacities of this lethal adversary.12 Finally,
USG recognition of the evolving AQ threat ensures
that strategists will be tasked with developing effective methods for countering this resilient foe. 13
THREE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
The seminal 9/11 Commission Report (2004) identifies three key strategic objectives for a comprehensive
counter-AQ strategy: (1) attacking terrorists and their
organizations; (2) preventing the continued growth of
Islamist terrorism; and, (3) protecting against and preparing for terrorist attacks.14 Progress on two of these
three strategic objectives, attacking terrorists and their
organizations and protecting against and preparing
for terrorist attacks, has certainly contributed to preventing successful mass-casualty terrorist attacks on
the scale of September 11, 2001 (9/11).
Attacking Terrorists and Their Organizations.
Defeating the AQ terrorist entity necessitates systematically attacking, degrading, and ultimately destroying its means of sustaining itself as an ongoing
organizational enterprise. Military, diplomatic, financial, legal, and intelligence instruments of national
power have been deployed to great effect to accomplish the following: identify and prioritize sanctuary
denial, actual or potential, in free states, failing states,
and remote regions; attack terrorists and their organizations via identification, disruption, capture, and
kill; attack elements required for complex international terrorist operation, including time, space, the ability
to plan, and presence of a functional command structure; constrain the opportunity and space to recruit,
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train, and select operatives; attack and deny logistics
networks; deny access to weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) elements; disrupt reliable communication;
and, eliminate the ability and opportunity for pretesting planning.15
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Matthew Olsen directly references these elements
when, in congressional testimony, he delineated accomplishments against AQ during the period under
review (August 2011-2012):
[W]e have made significant progress in the fight
against terrorism. Our nation has placed relentless
pressure on al-Qa’ida’s leadership. We have denied
the group safe havens, resources, and the ability to
plan and train. Following the death last year of Usama
bin Ladin, several of his top lieutenants have been
eliminated. The leaders that remain lack experience
and are under siege. They have limited ability to recruit and communicate with other operatives. In short,
the intelligence picture shows that al-Qa’ida core is a
shadow of its former self, and the overall threat from
al-Qa’ida in Pakistan is diminished. Further, the government has disrupted terrorist attacks in the United
States and abroad. Our intelligence officers have
worked diligently to identify and stop terrorist plots
before they are executed. And we have investigated
and prosecuting [sic] individuals who have sought to
carry out and supported [sic] terrorist operations.16

James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), also references this strategic objective when he
states in reference to “core AQ”: “Senior personnel
losses in 2012, amplifying losses and setbacks since
2008, have degraded core AQ to a point that the group
is probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale
attacks in the West.” He continues, however,
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The group has essentially the same strategic goals
since its initial declaration of war against the United
States in 1996, and to the extent that the group endures, its leaders will not abandon the aspiration to
attack inside the United States.17

Finally, in his May 23, 2013, National Defense
University (NDU) speech, “The Future of our Fight
Against Terrorism,” outlining and defending his proposed counter-terrorist policy and strategy states specifically in relation to targeting terrorists, President
Barack Obama stated:
After I took office, we stepped up the war against al
Qaeda, but also sought to change its course. We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda’s leadership. Today,
Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top
lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on
the United States, and our homeland is more secure.
Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on a path to defeat. Their remaining operatives
spend more time thinking about their own safety than
plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in
Benghazi or Boston. They have not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.18

The USG Policy of Targeted Killing of High Value Targets (HVTs) Using Armed Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs, or “Drones”). Apprehending, arresting, and incarcerating AQ terrorists has been pursued,19 and Special Forces raids carried out to find,
fix, and finish specific targets, including on May 2,
2011, AQ emir Osama bin Laden. Undoubtedly, the
targeted killing of HVTs using UAVs or “drones” has
been the dominant tactic of choice to disrupt, disman-

9

tle, and defeat AQ. After describing the Abbottabad,
Pakistan raid leading to the killing of Osama bin Laden, President Obama forthrightly stated his rationale
for a policy of targeted killing:
It is . . . not possible for America to simply deploy a
team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. And
even when such an approach may be possible, there
are places where it would pose profound risks to our
troops and local civilians– where a terrorist compound
cannot be breached without triggering a firefight with
surrounding tribal communities that pose no threat
to us, or when putting U.S. boots on the ground may
trigger a major international crisis. . . . To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama
bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case
were immense; the likelihood of capture, although
our preference, was remote given the certainty of resistance; the fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties, or embroiled in an
extended firefight, was a testament to the meticulous
planning and professionalism of our Special Forces—
but also depended on some luck. . . . And even then,
the cost to our relationship with Pakistan—and the
backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory—was so severe that we are
just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership. . . . It is in this context that the United States has
taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its
associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones.20

Evidence in support of the suitability/efficacy of
drones for finding, fixing, and finishing terrorist HVTs
is compelling,21 as is their lawfulness as a tool of war.22
This likely explains recent trends in the expansion of
drone bases whether used primarily for surveillance,
lethal targeting, or both,23 as well as more recent official pronouncements.24
10

The following evidence corroborates this assertion. The drone campaign largely focused on the
North and South Waziristan regions in Pakistan has
devastated key AQ-based leadership and operatives,
and key anti-USG forces attacking USG and Coalition
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Between 2004 and November 29, 2013, 353 strikes had
been conducted, with 342 taking place since January
2008, with the number of casualties as follows: in 2006
(122), 2007 (73), 2008 (286), 2009 (463), 2010 (801), 2011
(405), 2012 (300), and 2013 (119 as of November 29,
2013). Of those 353 strikes, 72 percent have hit targets
in North Waziristan, and 24 percent have hit targets in
South Waziristan. The number of Taliban/AQ leaders killed in the territories of various Taliban factions
from 2004-13 include the territory of Abu Kasha al
Iraqi (12), The Haqqani Network (14), Mullah Nazir
(9), Mehsud (7), Hafiz Gul Bahadar (6), Faqir Mohammed (2), and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (1).25 The New
America Foundation records the following totals for
the 2004 to November 21, 2013, time frame: total drone
strikes at 369; total numbers killed at 2,077-3,424, and
the total number of militants killed at 1,620-2,783.26
More telling, however, is the data for HVTs removed from the field of battle. The total numbers include 1 in 2004, 2 in 2005, 2 in 2006, 0 in 2007, 19 in
2008, 18 in 2009, 20 in 2010, 9 in 2011, 13 in 2012, and
19 as of November 23, 2013.27 Consider the following
select examples:
• Senior-level clerics and ideologues: Abu Yahya
al Libi,28 Kahlid bin Abdul Rahman al Husainan, Mansur al Shami;
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• Trainers: Abu Saif al Jaziri, Abdullah Hamas
al Filistini, Abu Musa al Masri, Abu Rashid,
Muhammaed Ilyas Kuwaiti, Muhammad Sajid
Yamani;
• Commanders: Abu Laith al Libi, Khalid Habib,
Abdullah Said al Libi, Hazrat Omar, Khan Mohammed, Sheikh Yasin al Kuwaiti;
• Financiers: Mustafa Abu Yazid and Abu Zaid
al Iraqi;
• Bomb makers and explosives experts, including
WMD: Abu Hamza and Abu Khabab al Masri;
• Faciliators: Abdullah Azzam al Saudi;
• Intelligence chiefs: Abu Ubaydah Abdullah al
Adam;
• External operations senior operatives or chiefs
to West and other regions: Abu Sulayman Jazairi, Abu Jihad al Masri, Osama al Kini, Saleh al
Somali, Sadam Hussein al Hussami, Osama bin
Ali bin Abdullah bin Damjan al Dawasari, Abu
Hafs al Shahri, Aslam Awan;
• Suicide operations chiefs: Wali Mohammed;
• High-level leaders: Hakimullah Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud, Tahir Yuldashev, Sheikh Fateh
al Masri, Jan Baz Zadran, Mullah Sangeen
Zadran, Abd al Rahman al Yemeni, Abu Miqdad al Masri, Badr Mansoor, Abu Usamn Adil,
Abu Yahya al Libi, Mullah Nazir, Attah Ullah
Rafy Khan, and Waliur Rehman.29
Of extreme value has been the removal of AQ’s
operatives who have previously become global
managers:
• Abu Faraj al Libi, from 2001 until capture in
Pakistan in May 2005;
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• Mustafa Abu al Yazid, (aka: Sheikh Saeed),
2005 until death by drone strike in May 2010;
• Atiyah Abd al Rahman, 2010 until death by
drone strike August 22, 2011; and
• Abu Yahya al Libi, 2011 until death by drone
strike June 2012.30
Seven key AQ leaders were killed by drone strikes in
Pakistan subsequent to the May 2, 2011, Special Forces
operation that led to the killing of AQ emir Osama
bin Laden:
• Abu Yahya al-Libi;
• Ilyas Kashmiri (head of AQ’s military and
member of external operations council);
• Atiyah abd al Rahman (bin Laden’s former
chief of staff and Zawahiri’s previous deputy);
• Abu Miqdad al Masri (a member of AQ’s Shura
Majlis also involved in external operations);
• Badr Mansoor (AQ leader in Pakistan and
key link to the Taliban and Pakistani jihadist
groups);
• Aslam Awan (deputy to the leader of AQ external operations); and,
• Abu Hafs al Shahri (senior AQ leader and operations chief for Pakistan).
The role of drones in attacking AQ’s lethal affiliate, the Yemeni-based AQAP, is similarly telling. The
number of U.S. airstrikes in Yemen climbed from under five per year from 2002-10 to 10 in 2011, 42 in 2012,
and 24 as of December 9, 2013. The number of AQAP
casualties was 81 in 2011, 193 in 2012, and 97 as of
December 9, 2013.31
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The USG-targeted killing of American-born Yemeni Anwar al-Awlaki, senior AQAP leader, propagandist, and religious figure, in a drone strike in Yemen on
September 30, 2011, is one of the more notable strategic
successes of the ongoing drone campaign in Yemen.
Killed in Marib in the Province of Jawf, Awlaki was
considered, “Al Qaeda’s greatest English-language
propagandist and one of its top operational planners.”32 Awlaki’s deadly reach is especially evident in
the plots he helped plan and persons he inspired to
attack in the United States. According to Peter Bergen:
24 ‘homegrown’ violent jihadist extremists in the
United States who have been indicted or convicted of
terrorism or have been killed while engaged in violent
jihad since 2001 read Awlaki’s propaganda or maintained contact with him.33

Some of the most notorious of those inspired by
Awlaki to perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate the
mass-killing of Americans, include:
•  Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, MD, age 39,
Army psychiatrist, recently convicted and sentenced to death on April 15, 2013, for the November 5, 2009, shooting and murder at Fort
Hood, TX, of 13 soldiers, and wounding 31.
•	Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, age 25, who pled
guilty to eight charges, including attempted
murder and terrorism, for the December 25,
2009, failed “underwear” bombing aimed at
downing Northwest Airlines Flight 253 carrying 279 passengers and 11 crew members as it
approached Detroit, MI.34
•	
Zachary Adam Chesser (aka Abu Talha alAmerikee) age 25, sentenced February 24, 2011,
to serve 25 years in federal prison for three
felony charges: providing material support to
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terrorists, communicating threats, and soliciting others to commit violence.35
•	
Najibullah Zazi, for the September 2009 attempted suicide attack in New York’s subway
system.
•	Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad, age 35, for
the failed May 1, 2010, vehicle-born improvised
explosive device (VIED) deployed in Times
Square, New York, now serving a mandatory
life sentence for his guilty plea on 10 felony
counts.
•	
Carlos Leon Bledsoe (aka, Abdulhakim Muhammad), for the June 1, 2009, drive-by shooting and killing of a soldier outside a Little Rock,
AR, military recruiting station, now serving a
life sentence.36
•	Dhokhar (age 19), and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (age
26), for having denotated two pressure cooker
bombs during the Boston marathon, killing
four (two females, aged 29 and 23; an 8-year old
boy; and an MIT police officer, Sean A. Collier,
killed three days after the bombing), and injuring 264 others, many seriously and requiring
amputation, including the serious wounding of
a Transit Police officer.
The present drone policy has disrupted a Mumbaistyle mass casualty terror attack directed at Britain,
France, and Germany37 as well as efforts to acquire
and operationalize WMD.38 It has also disrupted the
best of the terrorist bomb makers39 and those senior
operational leaders enganged in transmitting terror
craft to other affiliates.40 Finally, this drone policy has
also disrupted long sought after chief facilitators, couriers, and operatives such as Mustafa Hajji Muham-
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mad Khan (aka: Hassan Ghul).41 It also likely presumes
that the security of confinement and imprisonment
in many nations is unpredictable,42 and that, while
highly desirable and necessary, existing “Rewards for
Justice”43 bounties placed on HVTs cannot supplant a
surer way to find, fix, and finish declared enemies.
Many crucial HVTs are still at large and are certainly of intense interest to USG counterterrorism (CT)
operators. For example:
• Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri,44 present AQ emir and
life-long violent Islamist;
• Nasir Abdul Karim al-Wuhayshi, current emir
of AQAP and now general manager and second in command in AQ;
• Khalid al-Habib, responsible for AQ operations
in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan;
• Adnan el Shukrijumah and Saif al-Adel highlevel AQ senior leaders;
• Mustafa Hamid, father-in-law of Saif al-Adel;
• Shaikh Said al-Sharif;
• Abu Mohammad al-Masri;
• Anas al-Libi;
• Matiur Rehman, a Pakistani militant and AQ
planning chief;
• Abu Khalil al-Madani, senior AQ operative;
and,
• Adam Gadahn, senior AQ communications
and media official.
Also of intense value is Abdelmalek Droukdel (aka:
Abu Musab Abdelwadoud), leader of al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Magreb (AQIM), whose violent pedigree runs
deep, his having joined the Algerian Islamic Group
(GIA) in 1995, a splinter group, becoming a member of
the GIA splinter group the Salafi Group for Preaching
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and Combat (GSPC) in 1998—whose formal subordination to AQ was announced in 2003—to becoming
the emir of the GSPC in mid-2004, and after 2006 joining forces with AQ and in January 2007, changing its
name to AQIM. Others include:
• Sirajuddin Haqqani, head of the Haqqani
network;45 and,
• Ibrahim Sulaiman al Rubaish, AQAP’s
mufti and a former Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
detainee.46
Protection Against and Preparation for
Terrorist Attacks.
Protecting and preparing the U.S. homeland
against terrorist attacks is a second key objective of
current strategy.47 The following chief elements were
identified by the 9/11 Commission as essential to this
objective:
• prohibiting terrorist travel;
• acquiring and deploying biometric screening
systems;
• enhancing border security and immigration
law enforcement;
• enhancing aviation and transportation security;
creating a layered security system;
• setting priorities for national preparedness;
• ensuring that command, control, and communications are intact and operative following a
terrorist attack;
• enhancing private sector preparedness; and,
• ensuring that American’s civil liberties are
protected.48
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Several key agencies are tasked with contributing
to the success of this strategic objective, especially the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and several
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Multiple
official reports identify the above tasks as essential to
homeland defense and protection from terrorist attack.49 Accomplishments and the agencies involved
are identified by NCTC Director Matthew Olsen:
The government has disrupted terrorist attacks in the
United States and abroad. Our intelligence officers
have worked diligently to identify and stop terrorist
plots before they are executed. And we have investigated and prosecuted individuals who have sought to
carry out and support terrorist operations. In addition,
we have continued to build an enduring counterterrorism framework—including institutions like NCTC
and DHS [Department of Homeland Security]—dedicated to analyzing and sharing terrorism information
across the government and to the mission of detecting
and preventing terrorist attacks against our citizens
and interests around the world. The credit for these
successes belongs to the men and women in our military, law enforcement and intelligence communities.50

President Obama, in his May 2013 NDU speech,
identifies these same accomplishments while also stating that his approach will abide by differing “rule of
law” standards than his White House predecessor, ”. . .
we strengthened our defenses—hardening targets,
tightening transportation security, and giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror.”51 A generally
laudatory report issued September 2011 finds that 10
years after 9/11, of the 15 recommendations made by
the 2004 9/11 Commission Report directed at protecting
against and preparing for terrorist attacks, nine have
been fulfilled:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

terrorist travel
border security
international cooperation on border security
transportation security
improved aviation security
safeguard privacy of information
executive branch department to ensure civil
liberties/security tradeoff legally enforced
• objective risk assessment determines allocation
of homeland security assistance
• private sector preparedness
Seven recommendations required improvement or
remain unfulfilled:
• biometric entry-exit
• secure identification
• better passenger explosive screening
• justification of executive privilege
• entitlement to civil liberties
• incident command system adoption
• radio spectrum sharing.52
Data on terrorist incidents in the United States,
intelligence disruption of terrorist plots, legal actions
against terrorist plotters, and official response to the
April 15, 2013, Boston marathon terror attack largely
also corroborate the considerable successes in pursuit
of this strategic objective.53 It is important to note,
finally, these tasks essential to strategic objective #3
are the primary responsibility of the Department of
Justice, DHS, (created in 2002; combines 22 existing
federal agencies, workforce of 230,000, and budget exceeding $50 billion), the NCTC, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).54
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Preventing the Continued Growth of
Islamist Terrorism.
Compared with the previous two strategic objectives above, preventing the continued growth of Islamist terrorism has proven the most challenging.55
Indeed, during the past 4 years, challenges on this
front have emerged as a source of official reports,
commentary, concern, and perplexity. A seemingly
battered and bruised AQ, reeling from 5 years of
ramped up drone attacks and 12 years of post-9/11
USG CT policy and national vigilance, has somehow
managed to solicit and elicit the participation of hundreds, if not thousands, of persons radicalized by its
propaganda and recruited to any number of terrorist
plots. Debate at present among CT analysts and policymakers concerns not whether new recruits are making themselves available for terrorist acts, but how to
conceptualize this phenomenon, and what strategies
are required to combat it.
Official pronouncements of this emergent phenomenon are legion. Let us first consider a few of the
more prominent official USG accounts. The Bipartisan
Commission charged with evaluating the implementation of the 2004 Commission’s recommendations 10
years after 9/11 asserts:
Although Osama bin Laden is dead, al Qaeda is not; it
is a network, not a hierarchy. Over a period of years,
al Qaeda has been very adaptive and resilient. . . . Al
Qaeda’s capabilities to implement large-scale attacks
are less formidable than they were ten years ago, but
al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to have the intent
and reach to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack. Al Qaeda has been marked by
rapid decentralization. The most significant threats
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to American national security come from affiliates of
core al Qaeda . . . [al-Awlaki and AQAP; South Asia];
. . . failing or failed states such as Yemen and Somalia. . . . al Qaeda’s strategy of ‘diversification’—attacks
mounted by a wide variety of perpetrators of different
national and ethnic backgrounds that cannot easily be
‘profiled’ as threats. . . . Most troubling, we have seen
a pattern of increasing terrorist recruitment of American citizens and residents to act as ‘lone wolves’. Today, we know that Americans are playing increasingly
prominent roles in al Qaeda’s movement. MuslimAmerican youth are being recruited in Somali communities in Minneapolis and Portland, Oregon, in some
respects moving the front lines to the interior of our
country. . . . Alarmingly, we have discovered that individuals in the U.S. are engaging in ‘self-radicalization’.
This process is often influenced by blogs and other
online content advocating violent Islamist extremism.
While there are methods to monitor some of this activity, it is simply impossible to know the inner thinking
of every at-risk person. Thus, self-radicalization poses
a serious emerging threat in the U.S.56

A similar characterization of this emergent phenomenon is described in the 2011 National Strategy for
Counterterrorism (NSCT). For example:
[I]n recent years the source of the threat to the United
States and its allies has shifted in part toward the periphery—to groups affiliated with but separate from
the core group in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This also
includes deliberate efforts by al-Qa’ida to inspire individuals within the United States to conduct attacks on
their own.57

The broadened definition of an “adherent” in this
NSCT also evidences this shift: adherent is defined as
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[i]ndividuals who have formed collaborative relationships with, act on behalf of, or are otherwise inspired
to take action in furtherance of the goals of al-Qa’ida—
the organization and the ideology—including by engaging in violence regardless of whether such violence is targeted at the United States, its citizens, or its
interests.58

A litany of similar warnings is sounded at
various places.
Although its brutal tactics and mass murder of Muslims have undermined its appeal, al-Qa’ida has had
some success in rallying individuals and other militant groups to its cause. Where its ideology does resonate, the United States faces an evolving threat from
groups and individuals that accept al-Qa’ida’s agenda
whether through formal alliance, loose affiliation, or
mere inspiration. . . . Adherence to al-Qa’ida’s ideology may not require allegiance to al-Qa’ida, the organization. Individuals who sympathize with or actively
support al-Qa’ida may be inspired to violence and can
pose an ongoing threat, even if they have little or no
formal contact with al-Qa’ida. Global communications
and connectivity place al-Qa’ida’s calls for violence
and instructions for carrying it out within easy reach
of millions. Precisely because its leadership is under
such pressure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qa’ida
has increasingly sought to inspire others to commit
attacks in its name. Those who in the past have attempted attacks in the United States have come from
a wide range of backgrounds and origins, including
U.S. citizens and individuals with varying degrees of
overseas connections and affinities.59
[We] must retain a focus on addressing the near-term
challenge of preventing those individuals already on
the brink from embracing al-Qa’ida ideology and resorting to violence.60
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. . . [P]lots directed and planned from overseas are not
the only sort of terrorist threat we face. Individuals inspired by but not directly connected to al-Qa’ida have
engaged in terrorism in the U.S. Homeland. Others are
likely to follow their example, and so we must remain
vigilant.61
Europe also faces a threat from individuals radicalized
by al-Qa’ida ideology to carry out violence despite
their lack of formal affiliation with or operational direction from al-Qa’ida or its affiliates.62
The 21st century venue for sharing information and
ideas is global, and al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and its
adherents attempt to leverage the worldwide reach
of media and communications systems to their advantage. . . . In the global information environment,
al-Qa’ida adherents who promote or attempt to commit violence domestically are influenced by al-Qa’ida
ideology and messaging that originates overseas, and
those who attempt terror overseas often cite domestic
U.S. events or policies. At the same time, people—including those targeted by al-Qa’ida propaganda—live
in a local context and are affected by local issues, media, and concerns.”63
It is clear that al-Qa’ida the organization has been
degraded and out of weakness, called on individuals who know the group only through its ideology to
carry out violence in its name. . . . And even as the
core of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan continues to be dismantled through systematic CT actions,
we have expanded our focus in this Strategy to articulate the specific approaches we must take to counter
al-Qa’ida affiliates and adherents on the periphery, be
they established affiliated groups in Yemen or Somalia
or individual adherents in the Homeland who may be
mobilized to violence in al-Qa’ida’s name. . . . As some
threats have been diminished, others have emerged,

23

and—correspondingly—as some of our approach remain constant, so have others evolved.64

NCTC Director Olsen, after having cited great
progress along strategic objectives one and three,65
similarly remarks:66
While these gains are real and enduring, al-Qa’ida,
its affiliates and adherents around the world—as well
as other terrorist organizations—continue to pose
a significant threat to our country. This threat is resilient, adaptive, and persistent. More than a decade
after the September 11th attacks, we remain at war
with al-Qa’ida, and we face an evolving threat from
its affiliates and adherents. . . . Indeed, the threats we
face have become more diverse. As al-Qa’ida core
leadership struggles to remain relevant, the group has
turned to its affiliates and adherents to carry out attacks and to advance its ideology. The group remains
committed to striking Western targets, including the
United States . . . compel[ling] operational planners
to place a greater emphasis on smaller, simpler plots
that are easier to carry out . . . Since Bin Laden’s death,
multiple al-Qa’ida leaders have publicly endorsed the
concept of individual acts of violence . . . .
Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), including
those inspired by al-Qa’ida’s ideology, continue to
pose a threat to the United States. HVEs inspired by alQa’ida are almost certainly entering a period of transition as US-based violent extremists adjust to the deaths
and disruption of influential English-language figures
who helped al-Qa’ida’s ideas resonate with some in
the U.S. Now deceased AQAP members Anwar alAulaqi and Samir Khan were probably best positioned
to create propaganda specifically for an American audience and mobilize HVEs. Their propaganda remains
easily accessible online and will likely continue to
inspire HVE violence. The growth of online English-
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language extremist content during the last three years
[2009-2012] has fostered a shared identity—but not
necessarily operational collaboration—among HVEs.
Plots disrupted during the past year were unrelated
operationally, but may demonstrate a common cause
rallying independent violent extremists to plot against
the US. Lone actors or insular groups pose the most
serious HVE threat to the homeland. HVEs could view
lone offender attacks as a model for future plots in the
United States and overseas. The perceived success
of previous lone offender attacks combined with alQa’ida and AQAP’s propaganda promoting individual acts of terrorism is raising the profile of this tactic”67

In recent Congressional testimony, DNI Clapper
proposes a nearly identical assessment when he asserts that “[t]errorist threats are in a transition period
as the global jihadist movement becomes increasingly
decentralized” and comprises the following actors
of deepest concern to the USG.68 Core AQ will continue its targeting of the United States as noted above,
but one now must consider the following delineating and disaggregation of the contemporary threat
landscape. AQAP’s continued attempt to hit the U.S.
homeland but also adjust its own techniques, tactics,
and procedures in relation to more local objectives;
AQ-inspired HVEs which he estimates “will continue to be involved in fewer than 10 domestic plots
per year” and will be motivated to engage in violent
action by global jihadist propaganda, including English-language material, such as AQAP’s Inspire magazine; events in the United States or abroad perceived
to be threatening to Muslims; the perceived success
of other HVE plots, such as the November 2009 attack at Fort Hood, TX, and March 2012 attacks by an
AQ-inspired extremist in Toulouse, France; and their
own grievances.
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In a discussion of the “global jihadist threat overseas” including “affiliates, allies, and sympathizers,”
Clapper states that despite AQ’s complete absence in
fomenting the “Arab Spring,” it presents “opportunities for established affiliates, aspiring groups, and
like-minded individuals to conduct attacks against
US interests”; that the Arab Spring will also increase
the likelihood of diminished state capacities that
will facilitate:
weakened or diminished counterterrorism capabilities, border control mechanisms, internal security priorities, and other shortcomings in these countries—
[that] combined with anti-US grievances or triggering
events—will sustain the threats to US interests
throughout the region.69

The President’s 2013 NDU speech makes repeated
reference to the evolving threat environment now
confronting U.S. CT policy and strategy. Referencing
“core AQ” and “regional affiliates” in Africa, Yemen,
Somalia, and Iraq in terms identical to NCTC Director
Olsen and DNI Clapper, Obama explicitly identifies
the rise of home-based and home-grown radicalization and recruitment to terror70:
Finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States. Whether it’s a shooter at
a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin; a plane flying into a building in Texas; or the extremists who killed 168 people at
the Federal Building in Oklahoma City—America has
confronted many forms of violent extremism in our
time. Deranged or alienated individuals—often U.S.
citizens or legal residents—can do enormous damage,
particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent
jihad. That pull towards extremism appears to have
led to the shooting at Fort Hood, and the bombing of
the Boston Marathon. . . .71
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A recent report72 to the United Nations (UN) Security Council by a team responsible for reporting on
the implementation and success of sanctions pursuant
to Resolution 2083 (2012) concerning AQ, associated
individuals, and entities similarly finds:
•	that the AQ threat continues to diversify, with
the evolution of a range of loosely linked affiliates and the rise of autonomously radicalized individuals and cells drawing on AQ’s
ideology. While the threat posed by AQ as a
global terrorist organization has declined, the
threat posed by its affiliates and infectious
ideas persists.73
•	
Three developments point to the continuing
evolution of the threat. First, terrorist propaganda on the Internet continues to grow in
sophistication and reach, and is contributing
to the problem of self-radicalization. Second,
the recent attacks in Boston, London, and Paris
point to the persistent challenge of acts of expressive terrorist violence committed by individuals or small groups. Troublingly, these
may draw on autonomous attack plans rather
than the specific leadership tasking of either
AQ or affiliates.74 Third, the continuing civil
war in the Syrian Arab Republic has seen the
emergence of a strong AQ in Iraq . . . attracting
hundreds of recruits from outside the Syrian
Arab Republic.75
•	AQ and its affiliates have shown themselves
to be adept communicators, using marketing
and propaganda to cultivate supporters and
incite attacks.76
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Finally, academic analysts Schweitzer and Mendelbaum make several keen observations on AQ’s recent prospects, despite being damaged over the past
decade by a global anti-terrorist regime. “[T]he leaders of al-Qaeda and its affiliates,” they assert, “chose
to adopt the Arab Spring in order to turn it into an
Islamic Spring.” By exploiting toppled regimes, forming opportunistic tactical alliances, wreaking chaos,
fomenting ungovernability, taking advantage of security lapses, and streaming in foreign fighters, it may be
the case that:
al-Zawahiri’s vision of establishing a caliphate and restoring Islam’s lost glory seems imaginary, [however],
it is likely that al-Qaeda, by means of its affiliates and
perhaps also on its own, will try to renew its efforts
to carry out a grand terrorist campaign, as it did in
the past, following the withdrawal of the United States
and NATO from Afghanistan.77

Daily headlines and the increased probabilities associated with terrorist action arising in a less centralized fashion and involving persons more recently recruited to a so-called jihadist path typify larger swaths
of contemporary life. It is one thing to be treated to
high level reports, analyses, policies, pronouncements, and findings, and another to assemble the
raw data centering on individual persons whose acts
or potential acts lead them to find the very publicity
they seek.
We earlier listed some of Awlaki’s most prominent
terrorist recruits—Major Nidal Malik Hassan, Dzohar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, Zachary Adam Chesser,
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Shahzad Faisal, and
Carlos Leon Bledsoe. Let us now consider the briefest
sampling of others whose names have graced headlines in recent years:
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•	Bangladeshi Quazi Mohammed Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis, 21, arrested in a sting operation involving a fake 1,000-pound VIED bomb.78
•	Jose Pimentel, a 27 year-old Muslim convert
of Hispanic origin; a follower of Awlaki, constructed the bombs based on Inspire’s “Make a
Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”79
•	Naser Abdo, 21, a professed conscientious objector based on his Muslim beliefs:
found in a motel room three miles from Fort
Hood’s main gate with a handgun, an article
titled “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your
Mom” from AQAP’s English-language Inspire
magazine and the ingredients for an explosive
device, including gunpowder, shrapnel, and
pressure cookers. . . . Abdo told investigators
he planned to construct two bombs in his motel
room using gunpowder and shrapnel packed
into pressure cookers and then detonate
the explosives at a restaurant frequented by
soldiers. . . . On his way out of the courtroom he
yelled “Iraq 2006!” and the name of Abeer Qassim al-Janabi, a 14-year-old Iraqi girl who was
raped that year before she and her family were
killed. Five current or former soldiers went to
prison, one for a life term, for their roles in that
attack. He also shouted the name of Hasan,
an Army major and psychiatrist charged with
killing 13 people at Fort Hood.80

•	
Mohammed Mahmood Alessa, 20 (born in
the United States and of Palestinian descent),
and Carlos Eduardo Almonte, 26 (naturalized
citizen born in Dominican Republic), arrested
before boarding separate flights for Egypt and
then to Somalia, June 5, 2010, for planning an
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assassination to outdo Major Nidal Malik Hassan. “He’s not better than me. I’ll do twice what
he did,” Alessa allegedly said in undercover
recordings by New York Police Department
undercover officers.81
•	Rezwan Ferdaus, 27, studied physics at Northeastern University in Boston, his family resident in Ashland, MA, an upscale suburb west
of Boston, “admitted to planning to blow up
the Pentagon and the United States Capitol using remote-controlled planes laden with explosives”; sentenced to 17 years in prison.82
•	Adel Daoud, an 18-year-old suburban Chicago
man arrested for attempting to detonate what
he thought was a car bomb outside a Chicago
bar. . . . [He] had been under surveillance for
months, and in multiple conversations with
agents expressed a desire to kill on a mass scale
as revenge for what he believed was the persecution of Muslims by the United States.83
•	Walli Mujahidh, 34, was one of two men who
planned to storm the Military Entrance Processing Station south of downtown Seattle with
machine guns and grenades in retaliation for
U.S. military actions in Afghanistan. Enlistees
are screened and processed at the station. The
other conspirator Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif, also
known as Joseph Anthony Davis, was sentenced to 18 years in prison last month. The
pair, both U.S. citizens, were arrested in June
2011 and pleaded guilty of the attempted murder of officers and agents of the United States
and conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction. Grenades are treated as weapons of
mass destruction under U.S. federal law.84
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•	Gufran Ahmed Kauser Mohammed, a 30-yearold naturalized U.S. citizen born in India, and
Mohamed Hussein Said, a 25-year-old Kenyan,
were “accused of having used Western Union
to wire a total of $96,000 to an al Qaeda affiliate,
al-Nusra Front . . . and al Shabaab” in Somalia.
The money was to help Said in getting fighters
out of Africa and into Syria. The men have also
been accused of recruiting or trying to recruit
individuals overseas to join rebels linked to
al-Qaeda.85
Residents of various European countries also awaken
to similar headlines. Consider for example:
•	Seven suspects between 22 and 32 years of age,
all described as British residents, arrested in an
anti-terror operation.86
•	Three Muslim immigrants to Norway were arrested for a terrorist plot; a Uighur from China,
an Iraqi Kurd, and an Uzbek, had ties to operatives of AQ in the tribal areas of Pakistan,
all members of the Turkistan Islamic Party, a
Uighur separatist group based largely in the
lawless Pakistani tribal area of Waziristan.87
•	Three men, born in Britain of Pakistani origin,
were found guilty of the 2006 conspiracy to attack seven transatlantic airliners bound for the
United States and Canada with liquid bombs.
In all, 10 men faced charges in the case that involved three separate criminal trials; all but two
were convicted. . . . Scotland Yard, describing its
effort as the most elaborate terrorism investigation it has ever mounted, said the costs of the
police operations alone amounted to nearly $40
million. The case involved the deployment of 29
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separate surveillance teams during the months
the plotters were under observation and was
said to have been the most costly investigation
in the force’s history. . . . The bombs the plotters prepared for the attacks, consisting of liquid explosive inserted by syringes into plastic
soft-drink bottles, led to tight new restrictions
on the liquids and creams passengers can take
onto flights. . . . Prosecutors at the trials said the
plot, if successful, would have caused deaths
on a scale comparable to the 9/11 attacks, and
most of the potential toll of 1,500 to 2,000 victims were likely to have been Americans. . .88
•	Taimor Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, 28, a disaffected Iraqi Swede, detonated two bombs, killing
only himself. A Swedish citizen, he had been
living in Britain for the past 10 years.89
•	Raed Jaser, 35, born in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Palestinian parents but not a
UAE citizen, was living in Toronto at the time
of his arrest, and Tunisian-born, Chiheb Esseghaier, 30, both arrested in plot to derail a Via
passenger train running between New York
City and Montreal. Charged with conspiring
to carry out an attack and murder people in
association with a terrorist group, they could
face life in prison if convicted. . . . A few weeks
after Esseghaier and Jaser were arrested, FBI
officials arrested a Tunisian man in New York
who they said was linked to the Via rail terror
plot. Ahmed Abassi was charged with trying to
stay in the United States illegally to build a cell
for international acts of terror. Prosecutors said
Abassi had radicalized Esseghaier. The indictment charges Abassi with two counts of lying
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on applications for a green card and work visa.
Each count carries a maximum term of 25 years
in prison upon conviction.90
•	
Zahid Iqba, Mohammaed Sharfaraz Ahmed,
Umar Arshad, and Syed Farhan Hussain, between 22 and 31 years of age, were jailed in
Britain on Thursday for discussing terrorist
attacks, including plans to blow up an army
reserve center using a bomb-laden toy car.
They downloaded files containing instructions for the attack, bought survival equipment
and collected money for terrorist purposes.
The men were recorded discussing sending a
remote-controlled toy car carrying a homemade bomb under the gates of an army reservist center and speaking of using instructions in
an AQ manual to make an improvised explosive device. Iqbal and Ahmed were jailed for 16
years and 3 months, while Arshad received a
sentence of 6 years and 9 months. Hussain was
jailed for 5 years and 3 months.91
•	
Irfan Naseer, Irfan Khalid, and Ashik Ali
planned to detonate up to eight rucksack bombs
in a suicide attack or set off timber bombs in
crowded areas. . . . Prosecutor Altman said the
plot was “on a scale potentially greater” than
the July 7, 2005, bombings that killed 52 people on London’s underground train and bus
networks and that “the defendants were inspired to commit terrorism by the anti-Western
sermons of U.S.-born radical cleric Anwar alAwlaki.”92
•	
Michael Adebolajo, 28, born in Britain to a
Christian family that moved to Britain from Nigeria, who converted to Islam at approximately
age 16, after the 9/11 attacks, and Michael Ade33

bowale, 22 born in Nigeria and immigrated to
Britain as a child, brutally murdered Lee Rigby, aged 25, an infantryman in the Royal Fusiliers, and drummer who performed ceremonial guard duties at Buckingham Palace, while
Rigby was walking near a military barracks in
south London. He was first rammed by a car
and then hacked to death by these two knifewielding—meat cleaver and kitchen-knife—
assailants, one of the men shouted “Allahu Akbar,” or “God is great,” as the attack proceeded.
A man who appeared to be in his 20s or early
30s held a cleaver in one of his bloodied hands.
He offered what seemed to be a political message before the police arrived. “I apologize that
women had to see this today, but in our lands
women have to see the same thing,“ he said.
“You people will never be safe. Remove your
governments! They don’t care about you.” He
then referred to what appeared to be a motive for the attack, saying it was carried out,
“Because of what’s going on in our own countries.” Britain has suffered more than any other
country in Northern Europe from Islamic terrorist plots in recent years, and it has worked
assiduously to prevent more. Security officials have said that at any given time they are
tracking hundreds of young men in extremist
networks.93
The phenomenon of radicalization and recruitment
to various emergent non-U.S. conflict zones before and
after the Arab Spring is another noteworthy development.94 Again, a nonrandom sample of various recent
news accounts may be perused in support.95
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MESSAGE RESONANCE AND U.S. CREDIBILITY
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: USG DEEDS,
ACTIONS, AND POLICIES AS
COMMUNICATION
A voluminous literature exists analyzing, evaluating, and proposing policies to counter (self-) radicalization and (self-) recruitment to AQ-based, affiliated,
associated, or inspired terrorist attacks. A panoply of
psychological and sociological variables is proposed
as predictors of terrorist actions. These include: being male, aged 16-44, occupationally marginalized,
religiously intolerant or a new religious convert, exhibiting an unstable or crisis-prone social identity,
personally maladaptive, and possessing a lack of psychosocial resilience.96 However, as Sageman points
out, though these states and traits are undoubtedly
significant and at least partially descriptive of persons
who engage in terrorist acts,97 tens or hundreds of millions of persons worldwide exhibit these same states
and traits who do not engage in terrorist behaviors.
More problematic for purely compensatory theories
of terrorist behavior, the vast majority does not exhibit any abnormal psychological or psychosocial traits,
and many lead relatively successful lives, both materially and relationally.
Moreover, psychologically normal affective bases
underpinning terrorist motivation—anger, moral indignation, moral outrage, or at its outermost limit, categorical hate—sufficiently explain why many terrorist
recruits self-deploy as human bombs and killers. Revenge and retribution for perceived wrongs committed against Muslims is cited as justification, again and
again, exceeding by a huge factor excuses or justifications made in the name of Islam or shari’a, let alone
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the jurisprudence governing the fighting of jihad (fiqh
al-jihad.98 Rather, it is because these persons perceive
that the West generally and the United States in particular is at war with Islam—oppressing, aggressing,
humiliating, murdering, and exploiting Muslims—
that terrorist acts are, in their minds, morally justified.
Finally, this empathy and moral indignation are considerably enabled by both a real or vicarious identification as “fictive kin” of the worldwide Islamic umma
or faith community, and an actual kinship among
diasporic populations.99
If one excepts abnormal psychological traits among
select lone-wolf terrorists, then countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ terrorism requires that one
abandon the hunt for the “terrorist mind” and take up
the task of countering the (mis-) perception that the
United States is an aggressive, oppressive, and exploitative power truly at war with and inexorably hostile
to Islam. This task entails engaging three key psychological variables—perception (cognition), affect (emotions), and behavior (volition)—causally related in the
following manner: Changing perception from one of
oppression, to one of fairness and fair dealing ordinarily diminishes one’s sense of moral indignation and
outrage. This diminished moral outrage ordinarily
eliminates the desire to seek retributive justice, and
in extreme cases, violent revenge. Finally, the dissolution of a desire for violent revenge against one or one’s
(real or fictive) kinsman’s perceived oppressors greatly reduces the likelihood one will be self-recruited to
engage in terrorist acts.100
If the United States is at war with Islam and Muslims worldwide, it stands to reason that one must attack and confront the American foe. It would not be
an act of cowardice, but one of courage, to do so. It

36

would involve sacrificing possibly one’s life, estate,
and friends and family; for some, exiting a life of relative security, privilege, and opportunity. But the defense of the defenseless against a perceived predatory
power requires that one leave this life behind, and that
after this life, Allah’s favor will more than make up for
the fears, tears, and disrupted lives that this sacrificial death entails. These affective variables—revenge,
moral outrage, retribution, payback, defense of one’s
religion, and defense of one’s people—I believe, must
be fully understood and combated at the level they
require.101
*****
In the remainder of this monograph, a distinct
method is proposed for countering the perception that
the United States is at war with Islam, the moral outrage it inspires, and the terrorist response it too often
enjoins. I shall call this method “a War of Deeds” or
“counterpropaganda of the deed.” The latter phrase,
analytically compelling and a time-honored military
art, may nevertheless be tainted by the negative attributes associated with the term “propaganda.” The
former War of Deeds avoids the stigma of “propaganda” and offers the twin benefit of contrast to a “war of
ideas” approach, the problems of which will be identified at appropriate points. Further, by emphasizing
deeds, actions, and USG policies, rather than words,
intentions, and promises, we shift the primary battleground to one of countering enemy propaganda with
facts and evidence that I believe can, if deftly crafted
in a systematic, sustained campaign, eviscerate AQ’s
fabrications and lies. This proposed War of Deeds is offered as a distinct, realistic, and credible approach for
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neutralizing, combating, and ultimately obliterating
the affective outrage propelling recruits to place their
lives at the service of AQ’s terrorist modus operandi.
It is to be fought on two fronts, “changing deeds” and
“challenging deeds.”
Changing deeds, the first front, enhances the resonance of the USG message in the Arab and Muslim
world through actively fostering policies that reinforce, amplify, and increase the probable success of
the second front—challenging AQ’s disinformation,
fabrications, lies, and distortions.
Changing deeds requires that the USG honestly
examine the actual impact of U.S. foreign and military
policy in the greater Muslim world. It is imperative
that the USG make the case in deeds, actions, and
official policies, not intentions or promises, that the
United States is not at war with Islam or Muslims, and
is indeed a formidable power whose interests, values,
and ultimate objectives are not inimical to Islam and
the Islamic faith, the Islamic Call and Muslim interests. It is not perfection, but the proven absence of
enmity or active pursuit of policies, deeds, or actions
designed to denude and destroy Islam, or predatory
waging of war against a weak and defenseless umma,
that must be proved.
Challenging deeds, the second front, requires that
the USG successfully refute AQ’s propaganda, disinformation, fabrications, and distortions regarding the
practical consequences of U.S. deeds, policies, and actions, and of AQ’s own, in the Muslim world.
These two interrelated tasks have a common objective: persuasively proving in deeds, actions, policies,
and actual behaviors that the USG is not at war with
Muslims and Islam. That this must be proven and
not taken for granted; that this not be seen as an ex-
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ercise akin to combating holocaust denial or the 9/11
“truthers” is essential. It is not essential that the United States be innocent of superpower motives, actions,
intentions, or behaviors; nor that, there is no national
dirty laundry, past or present, to discuss. What is essential is that we prove that these actions do not signify any type of ongoing, systematic enmity directed
at Islam, Muslims, or the Arab World in particular.
We must prove this even though USG actions may on
occasion signify other potentially unsavory interests
and alliances, as well as many potentially and actually
beneficent means and ends. In short, what must be
proved, through the evidence of deeds and not intentions, promises, or attempts at spin, is that the United
States is not now and has never been at war with Islam
and does not actively desire nor require its negation.
Furthermore, the USG must prove it is innocent of all
charges of intentionally targeting, harming, or fostering aggression against or oppression of Muslims on
account of faith or works.
CHANGING DEEDS AND ENHANCING
MESSAGE RESONANCE
Changing deeds is key to enhancing message resonance and is the necessary first front in a sustained
campaign to counter radicalization and recruitment
to AQ-inspired terrorism. This premise rests on three
propositions. First, there is widespread recognition
among officials charged with enhancing U.S. credibility, that deeds, actions, and policies are persuasive
communication. As we will soon see, official attempts
to obscure this simple fact through public diplomacy
or strategic communication are doomed to fail. Second, considerable literature comprised of official USG
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policies and reports from government oversight bodies, academics, and think tanks concludes that opposition to American foreign and military policies, and not
to Americans or American values per se, are key drivers of anti-American animus and the proximate cause
for declining U.S. credibility and standing in the Arab
and Muslim world. Third, despite anti-American animus motivated by opposition to U.S. foreign and military policies, however, no objective evidence exists of
any officially-sanctioned USG “Crusader” war being
waged against Islam as a religious faith, or Muslim
adherents to that faith. Let us examine these in turn.
The Limits of Public Diplomacy and Strategic
Communication: Or, the “Lipstick on Pigs”
Problem.102
The Information Operations Primer defines “Strategic Communication” as “the orchestration of actions,
words, and images to achieve cognitive effects in support of policy and military objectives.”103 Though all
communicative elements are important, U.S. Army
information operations specialists most especially
view actions to be as effective and successful strategic communication. Actions “speak for themselves”
and signify the assurance of intentions and values far
more than promises and platitudes. Though primarily written with specific military operations in mind,
the following assertion can easily be generalized to
human actions:
[S]enior officials point out that strategic communication is ’80% actions, and 20% words.’ Specifically, how
military operations are conducted affects the information environment by impacting perceptions, attitudes
and beliefs . . . [and] . . . how military operations are
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conducted or policy is implemented is also a key component of strategic communication, since actions send
very loud and clear messages.104

The primacy of actions is also evident in a criticism
of the concept “strategic communications” by retired
admiral Michael Mullen, former chairman of Joint
Chiefs of Staff. In opposition to a “marketing model
of countering Taliban propaganda being promoted
by the Rendon Group,” Mullen reportedly refuses
to even use the phrase strategic communication and
insists simply on providing “information and context
about military operations.” He declares:
I really do not like the term at all. It confuses
people. . . . It means all things to all people. It’s way
overused and overrated. I literally try never to use the
term. We communicate as much if not more by our actions.
I have become particularly concerned at a time that
resources are so precious. It has become a thing unto
itself. It is taking resources from the fight. I don’t have
time for it. (emphasis added).105

Actions are deemed key to the more general concept of information operations as well. The purpose of
information operations is:
. . . to influence the behavior of target decision-makers
while simultaneously defending friendly decisionmakers from being influenced by an adversary’s use
of information. This is no different from the exercise
of the other forms of national power. In this instance
the means is information, but the resulting outcome is
the same.106

The key role of actions among forms of influence,
however, is well noted:
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[P]ersonal interactions are perhaps the most important means a target audience can be influenced. In the
context of persuasive influence, these interactions can
range from compulsion and coercion on one end of
the spectrum to cooperation and collaboration on the
other. . . . Regardless of how a message is transmitted,
the credibility of our messages and messengers is key
to the effectiveness of our influence efforts. We must
recognize that we lose credibility when the implied messages of our actions do not match the messages of our covert
communications. If these messages are not coordinated
during the IO planning process, our credibility and effectiveness suffer (emphasis added).107

Other agencies also recognize the role of deeds in
general, as well as the vital role of deeds in diagnosing
and diminishing the present U.S. credibility gap in the
Arab and Muslim world. However, unlike the matterof-fact role ascribed to actions above, this explicit recognition of the importance of deeds frequently gets
dialed down and packaged in strategies far less bold
than demanded. Minimizing the importance of deeds
shows a failure of imagination or an unwillingness to
fully consider the implications of one’s premises at
best. At worst, charges of inconsistency, incoherence
or even duplicity may be leveled. Some examples of
this behavior and its results follow.
Let us first consider one of the earliest examples
of this schizoid character. It actually calls for putting
“lipstick on a pig” in order to make what are undesirable policies appear something other than they
are. Just over a month after 9/11, Richard Holbrooke,
then-ambassador to the UN, issued one of the earliest alarms to policymakers and the public of our apparently inexplicable failure to counter what then
appeared to be the unstoppable juggernaut of Osama
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bin Laden’s propaganda. Consider the following
assertion:
Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or—if you really want to be blunt—
propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what
this war is really about in the minds of 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance. Yet every expert in Islam, every analyst of
what is happening in the Muslim world, agrees that
Osama bin Laden has gained the initial advantage in
this struggle by arguing that this is a war against Islam, rather than, as President Bush correctly says, a
war against terrorism. At first glance, this seems incredible: How could a mass murderer who publicly
praised the terrorists of Sept. 11 be winning the hearts
and minds of anyone? How can a man in a cave out
communicate the world’s leading communications
society?108

To what, then, does Holbrooke attribute this U.S.
failure in public diplomacy and strategic communication? “Part of Bin Laden’s success lies in his shrewd
mix of modern media technologies and medieval symbols,” Holbrooke declares, “. . . [a]nother factor is his
exploitation of the seething resentment of Arabs toward U.S. support for Israel.” Remarkably, Holbrooke
then declares each of these elements as “largely outside our control.”109
Bin Laden’s message is out of our control because
he “controls his own message,” and as for the second,
Holbrooke asserts, “we cannot reward terrorism by
reducing our support for Israel.” But one might ask
at this point, isn’t it crucial, at the very least, to forthrightly recognize that perceptions of the United States
as backer and facilitator of a continuing occupation
and humiliation of Palestinian aspirations underpin
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anti-American animus, and not a hatred of America or
Americans, let alone American values? In fact, could
not the case be made here that it is precisely the unwillingness to extend these cherished American values of liberty, self-determination, and social justice
to the case of the Israel-Palestinian confrontation, or
continuing support for repressive autocratic governments—one that profoundly undermines credibility throughout the Arab and Muslim world, as well
as many other quarters—that is the elephant in the
room? Or, to conclude that it is American hypocrisy,
not American ideals and values that underpins the
U.S. credibility problem and facilitates resonance of
Osama bin Laden’s terrorist propaganda?110
Instead, Holbrooke offers an unconvincing or, at
worst, an incoherent retort. His first move is to cast
USG policy against AQ as an ideological war, a socalled “battle of ideas,” rather than one based in policies, actions, and deeds. His second tack is to recognize the importance of actions, but in terms that belie
the logic of his own admission that a “seething resentment” in the Arab Muslim world must be addressed.
Let us consider each in turn.
What should concern us most urgently are the apparent failure of our own message and the inadequacy of
our messengers. If we fail to convince Muslims that
this is not a war against Islam but a war against terrorism, if bin Laden succeeds in defining the struggle
in his own terms, then he will have succeeded in his
goal—even if, as I confidently believe will be the case,
he is tracked down and ultimately eliminated. . . . The
battle of ideas therefore is as important as any other aspect of
the struggle we are now engaged in. It must be won. To fix
this problem we must address both the message and
the messengers (emphasis added).111

44

While important steps, such as “visiting the Islamic Center in DC” and “meetings with leading
Muslims and Arab Americans,” were immediately
taken in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11),
Holbrooke stated afterwards that things have “gone
downhill.” He believes the missed opportunities that
could have prevented this about-face involve the following: failure to open a dialogue with “key Muslim
intellectuals” over an errant and murderous misuse of
the Qur’an, failure to publicize the fact that hundreds
of Muslims were also murdered in the terrorist attack
on the 9/11, the failure to prove to Muslim women
that they would be sent back to a stone age should Bin
Laden triumph, and finally, the failure “to find credible Arabic-speaking Muslims to speak the truth about
bin Laden.”
It is undoubtedly true that leveraging the jurisprudence of lawful jihad, identifying the terrorist
violations of that law, and specifying the major sins
committed is an important tactic, one that the present
writer advocates.112 However, it is insufficient since
only a sliver of potential recruits is apprised of this
jurisprudence, and likely bound to it. Also, what does
Holbrooke mean by “the truth of Bin Laden”? Who
are these “credible Arab-speaking Muslims” who
shall speak such a “truth”? For Holbrooke, it is simply
inexplicable why the United States could or should be
losing this propaganda war: certainly there is someone who can say something that can undermine the
legitimacy of this man who speaks from a cave! Missing here, is any discussion of actions, deeds, and USG
policies examined from the point of view of those who
may see themselves as potential victims and seek to
become agents seeking retribution, even if the method
of terror amounts to a morally reprehensible and mur-
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derous tactic. But Holbrooke believes, it seems, to even
raise the question of policy is to “reward terrorism.”
Holbrooke concludes his clarion call by identifying
the “messengers” required to arrest the decline in, rectify, and fortify U.S. credibility. Actually, the only discussion of messengers he offers had already occurred
when Holbrooke invoked “credible Arab-speaking
Muslims,” as possible ambassadors who will speak
to the purity of America’s intentions and ideals. He
deems these possible ambassadors as “key Muslim
intellectuals,” or “leading Muslims and Arab Americans.” Here, he actually discusses the media required,
and more specifically, the agencies required, to mobilize to confront the bin Laden virus. What he suggests
is the need for a full-blown national propaganda effort
along the lines of World War II and the Cold War.
A similar special office is essential now. It must be run
from the White House, the only place in Washington
that can coordinate—by which I mean direct—public
affairs activities of State, Defense, Justice, CIA, AID
and others toward the Muslim world. More resources
will be required; special broadcasting systems dedicated to this cause must be created, not for Afghanistan, but for the entire Muslim world, including Muslims in non-Arab countries such as India and China,
and for that matter, Western Europe, where the terror
networks are deeply embedded. . . . This must be a
sustained effort separate from, but closely allied to,
the war on terrorism. In fact, it will last longer than
the war itself and would, if successful, have other
benefits. . . . We cannot afford to lose; and if we do, a
permanent struggle will lead to a permanent crisis—
just what bin Laden and his supporters want.113

Holbrooke’s opinion editorial, penned just 1
month after the 9/11 attacks, presumes that a “battle
of ideas” must be fought contrasting an un-Islamic,
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murderous, diabolical bin Laden seeking the enslavement of Muslim women and the resurrection of a medieval caliphate, with America’s true values, virtues,
and ideals. “If only they truly knew what we truly
stand for!” he seems to declare. “If only we could tell
the true story of our commitment to human rights, democracy, social justice, and liberty for all! How can a
man in a cave out communicate the world’s leading
communications society?” he asked.114
Could he, with deep reflection, have answered that
it is not about communicating with high-sounding
words or wrapping oneself in glorious ideals. Instead,
it is about what we do, not about what we say about
what we do. It is about how deeds, policies, and actions communicate. It is about the experiences of those
who live with the consequences of these policies. It is,
in short, very much about the perception of virtually
unconditional support for Israel’s continuing occupation; of the politics of oil reserves; and the autocrats
and monarchs of the Gulf. It is about USG policy
and moral outrage. It is about credibility, in fact and
in deed, not about the failure of the world’s greatest
superpower to discover the philosopher’s stone revealing the secret message, messengers, and media,
required to refute bin Laden. It is the “lipstick on pigs
problem,” in other words. It is not about ideas, or a
“battle of ideas”; it is about deeds, and a War of Deeds.
Approximately 3 years after 9/11 and the inauguration of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), 1 year
after the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein and military occupation of Iraq, and 4 years into the second
Palestinian intifada, another promising yet highly
compromised beginning is in evidence in an early
official effort to diagnose what appeared to be an
abject failure of U.S. public diplomacy and strategic
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communication.115 A careful reading reveals a surprisingly candid analysis of how U.S. policies contribute
to this collapse in U.S. credibility.116 It is a prescient
analysis of the rise and power of nonviolent political Islamists, and yet, like Holbrooke, its response is
paltry and targets a narrow band of cherry-picked
pro-Western secular elites. This response never once
considers revisiting U.S. policy priorities to see how
they might affect those vast majorities whose opinions
are registered in plummeting opinion polls.117 Let us
briefly consider this scathing review of U.S. policies,
clear recognition of an ascendant nonviolent political
Islam, and impoverished suggested remedies.
By late-2003, virtually every major opinion poll
throughout the Arab and Muslim world was registering its lowest ever favorable ratings of the United
States. Without question, U.S. credibility was in
free fall.118 The predominant finding of this report is
unequivocal:
Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather, they
hate our policies. The overwhelming majority [in
opinion polls] voice their objections to what they see
as one-sided support in favor or Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the long-standing, even increasing
support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies,
most notably in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan,
and the Gulf states. . . . Thus the critical problem in
American public diplomacy directed toward the Muslim World is not one of ‘dissemination of information,’ or even one of crafting and delivering the ‘right’
message. Rather, it is a fundamental problem of
credibility. . . .119
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In another remarkably frank admission, the study
authors assert:
The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward—and potentially dangerous—situation of being
the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these
authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes
would not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken
sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast
for all Muslims and country-specific. This is the larger
strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S.
policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself.120

The report also betrays a very clear-headed analysis of Islamism distinguishing violent revolutionary
Islamism from nonviolent reformist Islamisms, each
with a similar short-term strategic objective:
If there is one overarching goal they [Islamists] share,
it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the ‘apostate’
regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main
target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the
actual fighter groups.121

A prescient analysis is offered of the role that these
reformists are likely to play and their closer proximity
to the aspirations and approved methods for achieving them supported by an even larger majority.
[I]t is even more interesting to track the relative weight
of the non-Jihadi Islamists, also called “moderate’ or
“New Islamists,’ because their professed vision of Islamic Restoration is non-violent, tolerant, and relatively pluralistic. It can be argued that the New Islamists
are in fact the true center of gravity in the Muslim
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World today, in that they have the most authority to
make change, and draw on the highest levels of sympathy form less-active, but receptive and supportive
Arab majorities. In this construct the Jihadis are seen
as perhaps necessary to make change begin and thus
become eventually inevitable, but the radicals do not
appeal to the majority of Muslims in terms of practical
change if and when the old regimes finally collapse.122

One would expect such candid analysis of the U.S.
strategic predicament in the Muslim world could and
should lead to a broader debate over policies, priorities, the consequences experienced by the vast masses
and the Islamist currents circulating among those
masses. Instead, we are treated to the following strategic recommendation. On the one hand, a “revolutionary” strategy requiring the USG should massively
inflate the resources dedicated to U.S. communication
efforts, including huge expansion in budgets, positions, authority, and a centralized executive-level focus.123 On the other hand, we should exclusively target
and selectively build-up U.S.-friendly agents.
The U.S. Government should target those who support, or are likely to support, our views based on
their own culture, traditions and attitudes about such
things as personal control, choice and change. Private
sector best practices define this as the ‘hard support’
and ‘soft support’ in a marketplace and they are not
only the likeliest to move in the U.S. Government’s
direction, but they’re also the likeliest to move others.
Both their behavior and viral communications form
the most powerful and credible medium for attitudinal change. Specifically, for example, we believe the
most ‘movable’ targets will be the so-called secularists of the Muslim world: Business people, scientists,
non-religious educators, politicians or public administrators, musicians, artists, poets, writers, journalists,
actors and their audiences and admirers.124
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The report suggests “state of the art practices” derived from advertising, marketing, and political campaigns to accomplish these goals, while assiduously
avoiding any further discussion of those policies it
correctly ascertained were the most significant impediments to U.S. credibility. Nothing is said regarding the grave strategic predicament facing the United
States as the final backer and guarantor of regimes
deemed tyrannical, autocratic, and undemocratic, or
as a state opposed to the legitimate aspirations of Palestinians. Instead this report insists that a secular elite
will assist us in lipstick sales, all along knowing and
actually having described in this Report the pigs for
which it is destined.
Several USG documents or high-level analyses
throughout the decade exhibit similar failures to boldly rethink U.S. policies and their relation to U.S. credibility in the Arab and Muslim world. In the June 2007
U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic
Communication issued by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,125 we learn of the
importance of the diplomacy of deeds,126 the importance of counterpropaganda, the necessity of countering AQ disinformation and propaganda in cyberspace
through further expanding the mission of the existing
State Department Digital Outreach Team (DOT), and
the necessity for a new Counterterrorist Communications Center.127 Yet, this diplomacy of deeds is reduced
to displays of U.S. humanitarianism during times of
disaster, famine, or poverty relief, which, in itself, is
insufficient for quelling a deeper animus rooted in
our chosen friends, strategic partners, and allies in
the region.

51

Unlike the unvarnished 2004 Defense Science
Board discussion of the deeper policy roots of the
U.S. decline in credibility, this report obliterates this
dimension entirely. Again, unlike the 2004 report, it
presumes a “Good Muslim/Bad Muslim dichotomy”
which entirely fails to understand the fissures that exist within Islam over AQ’s means and ends. Like the
2004 report, however, it entirely neglects potential Islamist and conservative allies and reduces the choices
to either “mainstream” voices that espouse and embrace secular liberal democracy, or AQ presented as
a caricatured death cult. AQ is presented without
sufficient understanding of the broader phenomenon
of Sunni militancy, and the potential of its reformist
variants as a form of political Islam not necessarily
inimical to U.S. core values and vital interests in the
region.128 There is not a single mention of Israel-Palestine, oil, or autocracy. Offering a compelling list of
messaging themes, and correctly defending the necessity of systematic counterpropaganda and leveraging
AQ’s violations of the shari’a and commission of major sins, one easily concludes that genuine grievances
are likely to be assuaged by words, and symbolic humanitarian gestures.
A second Defense Science Task Force report on
strategic communication issued in 2008 is a queer
creature, combining elements of its 2004 incisiveness
with what appears to be a continuing flight from its
implications.129 A promising beginning is made when
it states:
[W]e have changed our thinking in important ways.
This report reflects our heightened appreciation that
success in strategic communication depends on . . .
deep comprehension of the identities, attitudes, cultures, interests, and motives of others . . . awareness
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by leaders and practitioners that what we do matters
more than what we say. (p. x; emphasis in original).

So what shall our responses be to the documented
rise throughout the decade of anti-Americanism?130
The Report’s authors provide global survey data indicating extremely negative attitudes toward the U.S.
occupation of Iraq, increasing support among Muslim
and Arab societies for use of suicide attacks in Iraq
and especially in the Palestinian territories. One is
then treated to the following underwhelming correlations: between tsunami relief in Indonesia and improved attitudes toward Americans, but not American
policies; and, an even weaker correlation between U.S.
earthquake relief in Pakistan, and Pakistani attitudes
toward Americans or American policies. It is not just
that the correlations are weak, but that perceptions
of U.S. policies remain unchanged, despite gratitude
and improved attitudes toward the American public.
Symbolic and life-saving humanitarian gestures as
communication is certainly welcome, and necessary.
But the same persons who welcome such assistance
do not, as a result, abandon deep and abiding attachments and commitments to their sisters and brothers
perceived to be suffering under varying forms of occupation, oppression, and tyranny.
In a section entitled “Implications for Strategic
Communication,” another promising beginning is
made when the authors assert: “Disseminating information and ‘getting the message right’ are not top priorities. Trust, credibility, actions, legitimacy, and reputations are critical to success.”131 Rather than identify
concretely what policies and actions may lead to trust,
credibility, actions, legitimacy, and reputations however, the report then strangely references the need for
messaging and various types of messengers.
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Many federal, state, and local nongovernmental, corporate, and individual enterprises originating in the
United States are involved in strategic communication
with foreign audiences. While there is no single enterprise performing the role of program leader, each
program relies on many essential contributions from
beyond the domain of its central team to accomplish
its goals.

In the above statement, there is not a single mention of any actions, deeds, or policies whatsoever. In a
final flourish of suggested actions, in a section entitled
“Personal Interactions as Compelling Messages,” the
following are suggested as vital to improving U.S.
credibility throughout the Muslim and Arabic world:
the Fulbright scholarship program, foreign student
exchange programs, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs, the Peace Corps, lifesaving outreach, and military to military exchanges.132
It is hard to understand why “American Foreign
and Military Policy in the Arab and Muslim World”
are not included as having compelling messages. It
is as if we cannot understand how someone can like
you, but still not like what you are doing or have
done; that one cannot believe that others really do
not like how we treat (or they perceive how we treat)
members of their brethren, despite the fact that, as a
people and idea, America is viewed sympathetically.
What we do, not who we are—not how nice, how
generous, how good-hearted, how well-intentioned,
how lofty our ideals and commitments to actualizing human potentials; our actions, deeds, and policies—is what is most troublesome and unenviable to
these souls.
After a decade’s struggle to conceptualize and
execute a successful public diplomacy and strategic
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communication, Congress, via The Duncan Hunter
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal 2009,
required that the President submit “a comprehensive
interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication.” Between 2010-12, the President’s
initial proposal, a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report on that proposal, and an updated presidential proposal, were published.133 A decade’s debate
and trial-and-error had further refined the strategic
communications conceptual landscape; continued to
identify the critical importance of policies, actions,
and deeds; though yet again, one is left to feel that the
proposed remedies fall far short of those required to
refute, counter, and decimate AQ’s propaganda.
The objective of strategic communication is clear:
“sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our
policy aims.”134 How shall this be done? Two distinct
methods are advocated: more carefully aligning what
we say and what we do (words and deeds); and being
deliberate and engaged with the audiences we seek to
influence.135 These two components comprise the very
definition of strategic communication:
(a) the synchronization of words and deeds and how
they will be perceived by selected audiences, as well
as (b) programs and activities deliberately aimed at
communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including those implemented by public affairs,
public diplomacy, and information operations professionals (emphases added).136

As conceived then, the problem of strategic communication is primarily one of failed execution, or
flawed organization and implementation—a failure to
synchronize, a failure to deliberately engage—and not
the problematic nature of present-day U.S. foreign and
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military policies as communication. Or, so it appears.
So let us examine what is meant by “synchronization”
and “strategy for synchronization.”137
The following characterization is offered.138 Synchronization requires:
• Coordinating words and deeds, including the active consideration of how our actions and policies
will be interpreted by public audiences as an organic part of decisionmaking.
•	
The recognition that what we do is often
more important than what we say because actions have communicative value and send
messages.
•	
Fostering a culture of communication that values this type of synchronization and encourages
decision-makers to take the communicative value
of actions into account during their decisionmaking. The most senior levels of government must
advocate and implement a culture of communication that is reinforced through mechanisms and
processes.

This declared necessity of word-deed synchronization or word-deed consistency requires a “strategy for
synchronization” which combines several declaratory
sentences with suggested methods and means.139
•	A key lesson we have learned is that actions beyond those managed by the communications community have communicative value and impact.
Every action that the United States Government
takes sends a message . . .
• 
Importance of identifying, evaluating, and coordinating the communicative value of actions
as a proactive and organic part of planning and
decisionmaking . . .
•	
Ensure strategic goals and messages are well
understood at all levels . . .
•	
Raise awareness about the communicative impact of decisions and actions [and] . . . empha56

size the importance of considering such impacts
proactively . . .
•	
Ensure that forums exist for deliberating these
impacts on high-priority issues and coordinating actions with deliberate communication and
engagement.

The second base of strategic communication, “deliberate communication and engagement,” is characterized as follows:
•	A wide range of [USG] programs and activities
deliberately focused on understanding, engaging,
informing, influencing, and communicating with
people through public affairs, public diplomacy,
information operations, and other efforts.
•	. . . Coordination mechanisms and processes to
improve the United States Government’s ability
to deliberatively communicate and engage with
intended audiences.

The “Strategy for Deliberate Communication and
Engagement”140 is comprised of the following:
•	Programs and activities focused on communicating and engaging with the public need to be strategic and long-term, not just reactive and tactical.
•	
[F]ocus on articulating what the United States is for,
not just what we are against. For example, our efforts
to communicate and engage with Muslim communities
around the world must be defined primarily by a focus
on mutual respect and mutual interest, even as we continue to counter violent extremism by focusing on discrediting and delegitimizing violent extremist networks
and ideology. (emphases added)
•	
Deliberate communication also helps establish
the strategic messages against which our actions
are often judged by the public, and deliberate engagement helps identify how our actions are being
interpreted and perceived.
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•	It is vital that the United States is not focused solely on one-way communication, which is why we
have consciously emphasized the importance of
‘engagement’—connecting with, listening to, and
building long-term relationships with key stakeholders.141

Excepting the italicized bulleted point above—the
single instance referred to of genuinely substantive interests and policies—the document is an ode to methodology emphasizing the essential need to orchestrate
carefully words and actions, and make sure through
deliberate engagement this synchronicity may be further enhanced to advance U.S. policies. But, one may
ask, which policies? Let us reproduce this italicized
text and examine it, line by line.
[F]ocus on articulating what the United States is for,
not just what we are against. Is not the most telling
proof of what a country is really “for” reflected in its
policies, which, in turn, reflect vital interests, and ultimately core values? What we are “for” would then
translate into the concrete commitments we have
made, with blood and treasure, to uphold certain sets
of social and political relationships, and not others.
What we are “for” is what we promote and defend in
domestic policies and in foreign and military policies,
diplomatic policies and cultural policies. Is not “what
we are for” to be judged based on actions, deeds done,
commitments upheld, interests pursued? Or is “what
we are for” a reference to the values we claim to uphold, the beliefs we maintain, the intentions we aspire
to realize? The vagueness of the phrase “what we are
for” serves to remove the harder edge of governments,
peoples, militaries, security forces, police, prisons, and
states of banishment or permission to live, from view.
The same may be asked of its opposite, “what we
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are against.” We are against oppression? Then what
of crushing dictatorships? We value freedom? Then
what of imprisoned activists? We value self-determination? Then what about banishment from the political process? In the end, when the bodies and money
are counted that “stand for” and “stand against” realities in the world, what should one determine “we are
for” and “we are against.” This is the very opposite of
vague phraseology.
[O]ur efforts to communicate and engage with Muslim
communities around the world must be defined primarily
by a focus on mutual respect and mutual interest, even
as we continue to counter violent extremism by focusing
on discrediting and delegitimizing violent extremist networks and ideology. So, we are for “mutual respect” and
“mutual interest.” But in concrete, substantive, policy
terms, what does “mutual respect” and “mutual interest” look like? Respect is demonstrated in actions,
policies, and deeds, and quite evident when one believes their humanity, and that of their kinsmen, has
been treated in a dignified, honorable, and deserving
manner. Respect is earned when one is on the side of
actively opposing indignities, ignoble deeds, undeserved oppression, and humiliation. Mutual interests
exist when one reciprocates and exchanges a good for
a good, and when a common set of ultimate principles unite even persons otherwise quite different, to
recognize, cooperate, and identify. Liberty, opportunity, self-determination, sovereignty, dignity, family,
development, peace, security, hope, health, wealth,
wisdom . . . one can imagine any number of mutual
interests that could be shared. But we must get far
more concrete, and take into account whether present
U.S. policies, based in specific alliances and a certain
regime of stability, contain within themselves definite
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limits that prohibit, in practice, the kind of respect and
mutuality presumed above. If, in fact, a condition of
authoritarian denial of rights and freedoms is logically predicated on the United States as guarantor or
underwriter, what am I—an Arab, a Muslim, a man—
to conclude about the mutuality of our respect, and
our interests?
“But I truly do care about you! I believe deeply in
the sanctity of life, liberty, and opportunity!” To which
a sober response might be:
But the proof is in your policies, your deeds, and your
actions my friend. It is in your alliances, allies, and interests; it is in what you do, not what you say, or say
about what you do. Israel, oil, and autocracy, is what
I see. And it is I who pays that price, despite the nobility of the values you profess, and despite the very
often generous spirit of your people who birthed the
concepts I so seek for myself.

Not an insane retort to our baffled strategic communicator, not at all.
The vital significance of U.S. foreign and military
policy as a driver of Muslim attitudes and opinions,
and not some generic opposition to Americans or
American values per se, is also evident in other independent analyses of and commentaries on U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy. Only a
brief selection from a vast literature is presented below.142 An important 2003 report143 by the Center for
the Study of the American Presidency, in analyzing
the nature of the present U.S. credibility problem in
the Muslim world, is explicit: This hostility is especially relevant to perceived U.S. support for Israel’s unjust policies toward the Palestinians,144 but it extends
well beyond.
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[N]egative Muslim attitudes toward the United States
are not based on a general dislike of all things American or on a broader anti-Western outlook; nor are
they derived from a clash of values brought about
by globalization and modernization. Rather, as with
anti-American sentiment among many non-Muslims,
the principle source is aversion to U.S. policies. . . .
[S]kepticism about the U.S role in promoting democracy in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East is accompanied by a widespread belief that, while the United
States voices support for democratization abroad,
it supports autocratic regimes and helps ensure that
democracy is denied to many Arabs and Muslims. Despite the broad support for democracy and civil rights
in most Muslim countries, large numbers of Muslims
believe they lack such basic liberties as fair elections,
impartial judicial systems, freedom of the media from
government censorship, and freedom to criticize their
governments. The perception that America supports
many authoritarian governments, at least indirectly,
assists them in the suppression of these rights, especially in the Middle East, fuels anger at the United
States, and its policies (bold in original).145

Of the four major weaknesses evident in current
public diplomacy efforts to combat anti-Americanism
and the U.S. credibility deficit—U.S. policy, too little
funds, sparse media, and a trickle of U.S. messaging
swamped by a torrent of anti-U.S. messaging—it is
U.S. policy which is regarded as decisive:
[T]he (often enormous) impact of U.S. policies easily overwhelms the effects of policy advocacy and
other aspects of public diplomacy. The role that U.S.
actions abroad, and increasingly at home, play in the
formation of public attitudes overseas is far larger
than that of U.S. communications with foreign audiences. Public diplomacy has little effect when weighed
against American policies that are perceived by for-
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eign audiences to have negative impacts on human
rights, the local economy, or domestic politics (bold
in original).146

A 2003 Report examining public diplomacy, evidencing the key role of policy yet limiting itself to a highly
circumscribed mandate, asserts:
We fully acknowledge that public diplomacy is only
part of the picture. Surveys indicate that much of the
resentment toward America stems from real conflicts
and displeasure with policies, including those involving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Iraq. But our
mandate is clearly limited to issues of public diplomacy, where we believe a significant new effort is
required.147

Concluding Thoughts: Formidable Challenges,
Formidable Opportunities.
Four conclusions—three obvious, and one counterintuitive—are warranted by the above analysis.
Let us consider the three compelling conclusions first.
Though communication involves many potential modalities—words, symbols, and images for example—
policies, are also communication and as communication, USG policies are regarded by many analysts
and experts and critics alike as the most persuasive
signifier of genuine motives, intentions, values, and
interests.
Second, it is reasonable to conclude that opposition to specific U.S. foreign and military policies
deemed unjust, undemocratic, and insensitive to human suffering and human rights—most especially
U.S. policies privileging Israel, oil, and autocracy, at
the expense of Palestine148 and broader democratic
aspirations—not opposition to American values and
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ideals, is a primary driver of anti-Americanism in the
Arab and Muslim world. Though a small selection of
reports and analyses was reviewed, a vast literature
corroborating this conclusion exists.149 What we do in,
for, and to the Arab and Muslim world—not our values or who we are as a people—fuel moral outrage.
Indeed one may argue that it is precisely because
we all share the same values—that all people should
enjoy freedom and fairness rather than be subject to
tyranny and torture—that U.S. policies perceived as
underwriting or at least tolerating tyranny and torture
are the root cause of this moral outrage.150
Third, U.S. policies that undermine U.S. credibility
and inspire moral outrage serve to undermine other
forms of communication, often designated “strategic
communication” and “public diplomacy.” Analysts
correctly conclude that no amount of lipstick can be
put on these pigs that can successfully overwhelm
the matter-of-fact experiences and perceptions of vast
masses that associate U.S. interests with the subversion of self-determination and social justice in the Arab
and Muslim world. If a picture is worth a thousand
words, how do actions, let alone a systematic policy
maintained over years, convey this? If communication
is 80 percent action and 20 percent words and if there
is massive divergence between those words and actions, it is no wonder that USG public diplomacy and
strategic communication have faltered so badly in the
past decade.
One might conclude from the above that the U.S.
disadvantage owing to policy commitments is so severe, even crippling, that the attempt to undermine
radicalization and recruitment to the AQ terrorist enterprise and vision is a lost cause. But, a surprisingly
opposite counterintuitive inference actually recom-
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mends itself. What has been proven is that current
U.S. policies undermine U.S. credibility and inspire
moral outrage, and undermine message resonance.
What has not been proven is that official USG policies
furnish evidence of any sort of a specifically anti-Muslim animus, let alone a systematic war against Islam
as a religious faith, or against Muslim adherents of
that faith. There is, in short, nothing in the evidence
above that proves the United States is a “Crusader”
at war with Islam, or that U.S. interests, policies, and
values, require that Islam—even in its robust form as
an emboldened political Islam that views religion as
a matter very much for the public sphere including
law, culture, society, and state—be warred against.
What has been proved above is that American
policies are at war with American ideals—that our
policy and our democratic social justice rhetoric negate one another. American claims to believe in values widely admired throughout the Arab and Muslim
world are seen as hollow professions by a hypocritical
and compromised superpower whose genuine commitments are evident in its role as ultimate guarantor
and military protector of an illegal Israeli occupation
and usurpation of Palestinian aspirations, unhindered
access to major oil reserves, and the regimes that are
supported that make both possible, i.e., conservative
and counter-revolutionary autocrats and monarchs,
many of whom imprison and banish their democratic—religious or secular—opposition. Still, this is not a
war against Islam, but a prejudice in favor of a regime
of stability guaranteeing a particular status quo in the
Occupied Territories and Middle East energy corridors. It is not, then, an abandonment of a war against
Islam that is required: quite the contrary. It is simply
a rectification of existing policies to bring them into
alignment with deeply held American ideals.
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It is this credibility gap between professed aspirations and self-evident policies that has been the USG’s
Achilles heel. It undermines all other U.S. efforts to
persuade the Muslim world we harbor no enmity.
It also furnishes the raw materials from which AQ
draws its sophisticated terrorist propaganda. As will
be shown later, it is AQ’s offensive war against all
persons—whether autocratic regimes, American civilians or military, or any Muslim who does not embrace
AQ’s specific modus operandi—that has been successfully represented as a defensive war against the enemies of Allah, Islam, and the broader faith community
(umma). How is it that AQ—an offensive revolutionary, insurgent, terroristic Islamist movement combining transnational objectives with pragmatic strategic
doctrine—has successfully disabled the world’s only
superpower from defending itself against the charge
that the United States is an implacable foe of Islam;
upholds an anti-Muslim status quo; subjects Muslims
to barbaric and inhumane treatment throughout the
world; and launches wars of occupation, subjugation,
and humiliation? To return to Holbrooke’s perplexity,
but shorn of his unwillingness or inability to seriously
examine the moral outrage inspired by USG policies:
“How could a mass murderer who publicly praised the
terrorists of Sept. 11 be winning the hearts and minds
of anyone? How can a man in a cave out communicate
the world’s leading communications society?”151
The second front in the War of Deeds then requires
challenging AQ’s terroristic propaganda using actual
deeds—those of the USG and those of AQ—to determine in fact, that AQ’s case may be undermined by a
careful review of the evidence. It is to that task that we
now turn.
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CHALLENGING DEEDS: COUNTERING
AL-QAEDA’S TERRORIST PROPAGANDA
Most, though not all, of the terrorism we face is fueled
by a common ideology—a belief by some that Islam is
in conflict with the United States, and the West, and
that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course,
this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is
not at war with Islam; and this ideology is rejected by
the vast majority of Muslims, who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this
ideology persists, and in an age in which ideas and
images can travel the globe in an instant, our response
to terrorism cannot depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to
win the battle of wills and ideas.152

The Vital Function of Propaganda in AQ’s
Anti-American Terrorism.
Propaganda is a key method designed to influence the perception, morale, and will of various target
populations. According to the official Department of
Defense (DoD) definition, propaganda is “[a]ny form
of adversary communication, especially of a biased or
misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions,
emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group, in order
to benefit the sponsor, directly or indirectly.”153 What
is key for our purposes is not that this is adversarial
communication, or that it is a form of influence operations, but that AQ’s propaganda is dishonest, deceitful, deliberately distorted disinformation designed to
incite, inspire, agitate, and shape profoundly erroneous perceptions about USG intentions and actions
vis-à-vis Islam and the Muslim world. That the USG
suffers from a profound credibility crisis based in un66

popular USG policies and actions is disadvantageous
enough; consider, then, how this credibility deficit
facilitates the work of skilled terrorist propagandists.
That is precisely the present conundrum facing those
charged with strategic communication and public
diplomacy, and it explains our continuing failure to
undermine AQ’s propaganda juggernaut. It also explains how it is that thousands of persons are being
mobilized worldwide to target what they are being
told is an implacably evil enemy of Allah that must be
neutralized by any means necessary.
The Terrorist Quadrangle: The Role and Function
of Terrorist Propaganda as Communication.154
AQ’s terrorist propaganda is usefully conceptualized as a distinct element of a quadrangle linking political object, propaganda, terrorist attack, and strategic objectives. (See Figure 1.)
Though top-down versus bottom-up processes of
radicalization are differentially emphasized by analysts as key to AQ’s overall modus operandi,155 it is
this writers’ belief that top-down, bottom-up, and
interactive dynamics are all in play. Top-down dimensions include: AQ’s global media front, sophisticated propaganda mission, assets dedicated to inciting, catalyzing, mobilizing, educating and training;
its conspiratorial cellular structure operating within
both hostile environments and more friendly radical milieus to identify, target, and recruit potential
operators; and, control of sanctuaries (including virtual sanctuaries in cyberspace) permitting training in
terrorist techniques, tactics, and methods. Bottom-up
dimensions comprise processes of self-radicalization, self-recruitment, and the ever more common
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Political Object(s)
1. Overthrow regimes
2. Implement strict shari’a
3. Reorder sovereignty
4. Caliphal rulership
5. Base for Offensive Jihad
Strategic Objective(s)
1. Increase Al-Qaeda and
Associated Movements (AQAM)
(Incite, aggregate)
2. Undermine Enemies

Terrorist
Propaganda
(“Defending Islamic Umma
Against Crusader War”)

Terrorist Attack
(Propaganda of the Deed)
(“Defending Allah’s Religion, Striking
Terror into Allah’s Enemies, Paradise for
Martyrs”; “Exposing hypocrites, apostates,
puppets.”)

Figure 1. AQ’s Terrorist Quadrangle:
Relations of Political Object, Terrorist Propaganda,
Terror Attacks, and Strategic Objective(s).
phenomenon of isolated individuals and small groups
of acquaintances, friends, or family self-mobilizing
once they have been incited or inspired through
moral outrage and energized by various social-psychological processes to actively seek out AQ’s network.156 This monograph assumes that both processes
operate in highly complex ways and their interaction must always be kept in mind when formulating
concrete strategy.
AQ’s terrorist propaganda is especially relevant to
processes of home-based, home-grown (self-) radicalization and (self-) recruitment to AQ’s terrorist modus
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operandi. Consider, for example, relations between
tactical terrorist propaganda, fabricated agitational
and inciteful disinformation and the three key psychosocial variables identified earlier; perception, affect, and behavior. In this case, terrorist propaganda
is the proximate cause of a distorted perception of
USG policies, moral indignation and outrage, and
(self-) radicalization and (self-) recruitment to terror.
Successful AQ tactical propaganda feeds and nourishes behavioral radicalization by bringing to a white
heat feelings of moral outrage based in a perception
that the United States is the chief architect and arbiter of an oppressive, unjust power structure crushing
their Muslim and sisters. This moral outrage is based
on perceptions of social injustice that increase one’s
susceptibility to accepting the premise that the United States is an implacable enemy of Islam presently
engaged in a systematic war against the worldwide
Muslim umma; and, that terrorist actions are legitimately directed against the USG, its interests, and its
allies. This premise is both amplified and reinforced
by the USG credibility crisis, based in a gulf between
U.S. ideals and actions. Opposition to U.S. policies includes engaging in activities and finding outlets for
securing retribution and justice such as joining ongoing AQ campaigns and finding opportunities to die a
shahid (martyr). Persons embarking on this path conceive their actions as justified self-defense and not
unjustified criminal murder. They believe they are
assisting the oppressed and aggrieved, and fulfilling
the general religious obligation within Islam for ablebodied, capable, and knowledgeable persons to assist
in whatever ways possible and legal to lift the burdens of injustice and oppression from the shoulders
of those presently in the clutches of their anti-Muslim
oppressors.
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The Critical Function of Counterpropaganda
in Countering Insurgent Terrorism.
Deliberate and effective counterpropaganda is
deemed essential by analysts and expert practitioners
when the USG’s very credibility is at stake. It is also
used to counter and deflate the agitation, incitement,
and mobilization function of propaganda in the AQ
terrorist quadrangle.157 Unfortunately, despite this
admittedly critical role, recent changes in the official
DoD lexicon have obscured the precise conception
and definition of this task. As earlier defined, propaganda is deemed something only adversaries do
and is by nature disinformative. It is designed to use
fabrications, manipulations, and techniques of influence, to gain advantages for one’s own interests at the
expense of rationally conceived objective truth. Given
this negative function, how, then, can counterpropaganda be conceived?
PSYOP, recently renamed Military Information
Support Operations (MISO), was until recently the
official name given by the DoD to the activity most
resembling what one would imagine to be USG-based
propaganda.158 A most terse definition is offered by
U.S. Army Special Operations: “The mission of PSYOP
is to influence the behavior of foreign TA’s [target audiences] to support U.S. national objectives.”159 This
is not significantly different from the definition of
propaganda cited above:
[a]ny form of adversary communication, especially
of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of
any group, in order to benefit the sponsor, directly or
indirectly.
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Let us now juxtapose the older, fuller PSYOP definition with its MISO replacement term.
[PSYOP]: Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning,
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose
of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce
foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.160
[MISO]: Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning,
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner
favorable to the originator’s objectives.161

How Counterpropaganda Differs from Propaganda
or PSYOP.
The function of propaganda, PSYOP or MISO,
when stripped of euphemistic labels and spin, is to
manipulate target audiences using known psychological techniques so that one’s own interests are more
likely to be realized. It is part of the broader art and
science of influence operations, and deemed a vital dimension of warfare to the extent that attacking enemy
morale, will, attitudes, perceptions, and emotions, is
a key means of influencing an adversary’s behavior.
Counterpropaganda as I conceive it, however, does
not involve countering adversary propaganda with
one’s own. Counterpropaganda is the refutation of fiction by fact, not the opposing of one fiction to another.
In this monograph, counterpropaganda denotes
the logical and factual refutation of an adversary’s
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propaganda, where propaganda is identical to fabrication; disinformation; and deceitful, distorted,
and dishonest communication. This refutation must
be truthful, verifiable, credible, and subject to proof
based on tests of external reliability performed by objective observers. Its chief objective in the war against
AQ is first, to factually assess and evaluate the USG’s
and AQ’s actual deeds in relation to the Arab and Islamic worlds; and then, on the basis of such, formulate
deliberate counter-AQ information warfare strategy.
Conceived in this manner, counterpropaganda’s
nearest relative is countering adversarial disinformation, or “counterdisinformation.” This latter term fails
to signify that it is propaganda, and specifically terrorist propaganda, rather than information, that is at
issue in the terrorist quadrangle. Disinformation may
be a subset of terrorist tasks, but the unique properties of propaganda are not conveyed by the sanitized
term “information” any more than the term “Military
Information Support Operations” accurately conveys
its PSYOP function as military propaganda in support
of national objectives.162
ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE
USG COUNTERPROPAGANDA
COUNTEROFFENSIVE
In what follows, the chief elements of a counterpropaganda counteroffensive against AQ are outlined. Beginning with a discussion and conception of
influence operations, contemporary war and warfare,
and the instruments of national power, attention is
then turned to the key tasks required of the two fronts
in the War of Deeds.
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Influence Operations, Contemporary
War, and Warfare.
Influence Operations.
Counterpropaganda must first be conceptualized in relation to a broader concept of contemporary
war, warfare, and influence operations. Influence operations are those whose ultimate goal is to influence
behavior in a manner favorable to its sponsor.163 Influence operations address the full range of potential
variables, including traditional kinetic means, that
affect motivation, attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately
behaviors.
Contemporary War and Warfare.
Influence is the chief objective of newer conceptions of war and warfare achieved via a vast terrain of
social, technological, cultural, political, financial, and
psychological methods and means. Today’s battlefield
is not militarized and kinetic, but can be broadened to
include a virtually inexhaustible and unrestricted mass
of energy to be deployed in the service of policy.164 In
relation to this concept of war and warfare, a recent
author suggests the utility of discarding “conceptions
of war and warfare that include only the traditional
kinetic sense and instead think about forms of conflict
that do not take lives or cause damage.”165 Consider,
for example, the following conception:
What is significant is that all of these warfighting
means, along with their corresponding applications,
that have entered, are entering, or will enter, the ranks
of warfighting means in the service of war, have al73

ready begun to quietly change the view of warfare
held by all of mankind. Faced with a nearly infinitely diverse array of options to choose from, why do
people want to enmesh themselves in a web of their
own making and select and use means of warfare that
are limited to the realm of force of arms and military
power? Methods that are not characterized by the use
of the force of arms, nor even by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate
the successful realization of the war’s goals, if not
more so. As a matter of course, this prospect has led
to revision of the statement that ‘war is politics with
bloodshed’ [Clausewitz, Mao] and in turn has also led
to a change in the hitherto set view that warfare prosecuted through force of arms is the ultimate means of
resolving conflict [Clausewitz, also p. 7, 36]. Clearly, it
is precisely the means employed that has enlarged the
concept of warfare. Moreover, the enlargement of the
concept of warfare has, in turn, resulted in an enlargement of the realm of war-related activities. . . . Any war
that breaks out tomorrow or further down the road
will be characterized by warfare in the broad sense—
a cocktail mixture of warfare prosecuted through
the force of arms and warfare that is prosecuted by
means other than the force of arms. The goal of this
kind of warfare will encompass more than merely ‘using means that involve the force of arms to force the
enemy to accept one’s own will’ [Clausewitz]. Rather,
the goal should be ‘to use all means whatsoever—
means that involve the force of arms and means that
do not involve the force of arms, means that involve
military power and means that do not involve military
power, means that entail casualties and means that do
not entail casualties—to force the enemy to serve one’s
interests’.166
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From M, to Diplomatic, Informational, Military,
and Economic (DIME), to DIMEFIL, to DICEFILM:
On the Eight Instruments of National Power.
A counterpropaganda campaign directed against
AQ must also take into account the full range of elements and instruments of national power brought to
bear on those three chief variables enabling terrorist
actions: subjective motivation, subjective and objective capability, and objective opportunity. These eight
major instruments of national power—diplomatic,
informational, cyber, economic, financial, intelligence,
legal, military—arrayed against these three variables
are presented in Figure 2.

Combating the Three Bases Enabling Terrorist Behavior

Reduce Motivation
“The United States is NOT
and has NEVER been at war
with Islam. This is proven by
our words, deeds, and
actions.”

“Al Qaeda’s terrorism violates
Islamic law, is responsible for
major sins, undermines Muslim
interests, and uses murder,
force, and fear to impose its will
on others.”

Reduce Ability/Capacity

Reduce Opportunity

CounterAQ
AQ
messaging
through
systematic
Counter
messaging
through
systematic
counterpropaganda
in in
word,
and
deed.
USG
counter-propaganda
word,
and
deed.
USG
policies enhance and reinforce resonance
policies enhance and reinforce resonance

MESSAGE

Counter AQ messengers through HVT, discrediting and
delegitimizing, credible alternative messengers

MESSENGER

Counter AQ media through targeted removal, infiltration,
delegitimation, credible alternative media

MEDIA

DIPLOMATIC

INFORMATIONAL

FINANCIAL

INTELLIGENCE

CYBER

LEGAL

ECONOMIC
MILITARY

Figure 2. Elements of a
Comprehensive USG Counterpropaganda
Counteroffensive to Combat Radicalization
and Recruitment to AQ Terrorism.
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As one can see in Figure 2, inclusion of the cyber
(C) domain extends the principal instruments of national power beyond their originally-conceptualized
four (DIME), and more recent extension to seven by
adding the financial, intelligence, and legal domains
(DIMEFIL or MIDLIFE),167 to eight in order to fully
capture the means employed in the digital revolution
manifest in cyberspace.168 Well attested in recent doctrine and analyses,169 and obviously central to the domain of countering AQ propaganda, this essential element of national power must now be given its proper
recognition.170
Countering AQ Propaganda:
The Primacy of the War of Deeds.
Next, I briefly describe the two key fronts in a
War of Deeds designed to counter AQ terrorist propaganda. By deftly organizing a sustained War of
Deeds and, as a result, eviscerating AQ’s credibility,
the nexus between terrorist propaganda and terrorist
acts (see Figure 1) is severed. Ideally, this means that
an effectively sustained USG campaign can cripple
and render impotent AQ’s capacity to incite moral
outrage, radicalize, and earn new recruits as so-called
vanguard of a besieged.
The premise of a War of Deeds is that defeating
AQ does not require mimicking enemy tactics through
manipulation of evidence, spin, tricks or deceptive
arts of any sort. Instead it requires the confident deployment of human reason and martialing of genuine evidence that can in the long run triumph over
fabrications, propaganda, disinformation, and AQ’s
violent offensive war against all who disagree with its
political objectives, especially its terrorist modus ope-
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randi. Veracity and credibility rather than perfection
of USG deeds is key to a War of Deeds. An objective,
factual investigation of U.S. actions will not confirm
any kind of Crusader war against Islam. Reason and
evidence, duly combined, will reveal tractable clashes
of interests; intracivilizational fault lines over religion
and state; intercivilizational dialogue and conflict
over core conceptions, and even potential intercivilizational conflicts, and even occasional clashes. It will
not confirm, even remotely, however, a Crusader war
against Islam. Undoubtedly some elements within
U.S. society do seek a neo-Crusader agenda. This includes a Christian Zionist, Zionist, and neo-conservative political coalition which denies the policy roots
of anti-U.S. animus. Instead it argues exclusively for
war-footing against a supposedly ignoble Islamic or jihadist enemy found in virtually all guises—including
the bogeyman of the Muslim Brotherhood. Undoubtedly, this extremely powerful political coalition functions within the United States to prejudice policies and
foreign relations.171 Despite this, however, no rational
analysis of USG policies, deeds, and actions confirms
that it is official or unofficial USG policy to wage war
on Islam, Muslims, or the Arab Muslim world.
Countering AQ Messengers and Media.
A counterpropaganda counteroffensive along the
lines of the War of Deeds suggested here has as its
chief goal using three key elements—the media, messengers, and messages—to undermine motivation via
incitement to moral outrage, and thereby radicalization and recruitment to AQ terrorism. Let us begin
with the latter two first. As Figure 2 describes, countering AQ propaganda requires countering AQ’s mes-
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sengers. The specific methods, tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) specific to this objective include:
eliminating AQ propagandists through deliberate
targeting in ongoing HVT campaigns (e.g., Anwar alAwlaki and Abu Yahya al-Libi); infiltrating AQ oriented internet chat rooms and fora with the objective
of discrediting and delegitimizing AQ’s messengers
by countering disinformation, exploiting contradictions, and exposing fallacies; using the weapons of
ridicule, satire, and character assassination to destroy
messenger credibility;172 finally, attempts to recruit alternative messengers whose bona fide credibility may
be leveraged to further damage AQ’s jihadist brand.173
Second, AQ media must be countered, using such
methods and TTPs as targeted removal, infiltration,
delegitimation of AQ media and sources, and legitimizing alternative credible media sources that effectively challenge AQ’s propagandistic assertions.
Countering AQ’s Two Greatest Lies Using a
War of Deeds.
Destroying AQ’s messengers and media, and enhancing U.S. media and messenger credibility is necessary, but insufficient. The knock-out blow, I believe,
results when the USG overtly, directly, and effectively
challenges and refutes AQ’s most essential messages
in a War of Deeds. As Figure 3 indicates, there are two
vital “great lies” that AQ starkly juxtaposes—“The
U.S. Crusader” and “The Islamic Defender”—that
must be countered effectively in this War of Deeds.
To refute these great lies requires two countermessages. Message 1: “The United States is NOT and has
NEVER been at war with Islam. This is proven by our
words, deeds, actions, and policies.” Message 2: “The
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Al-Qaeda terrorist entity is a violent criminal enterprise that violates Islamic law, is responsible for major
sins, undermines Muslim interests, and uses murder,
force, and fear to impose its will on others.” Each
message, when combined in a sustained campaign,
counters these great lies using concrete facts, actual
policies, actions, and deeds associated with the USG
and AQ. To facilitate this task, let us juxtapose AQ’s
two greatest lies (propaganda) and the USG messages
(counterpropaganda) required to refute them:
AQ Great Lie #1:
The United States is engaged in a
Crusader-Zionist war against Islam
and the Muslim world.

USG Refutation of Great Lie #1:
The United States is NOT and has
NEVER been at war with Islam. This
is proven by our words, actions,
deeds, and policies.

AQ Great Lie #2:
AQ is fighting a defensive jihad to
protect the Muslim umma and Islam
from an offensive Crusader-Zionist
War.

USG Refutation of Great Lie #2:
The AQ criminal terrorist enterprise
violates Islamic law, commits major
sins, undermines Muslim interests,
and uses murder, force, and fear to
impose its will on others.

Figure 3. Method for Refuting AQ’s Big Lies.
Method for Refuting AQs Big Lie #1.
AQ’s first big lie—The U.S. Crusader War against
Islam—rests on five fabrications alleged as matters of
indisputed empirical fact, which have been central to
its earliest declarations of war in 1996 and 1998, justifying the killing of Americans, civilian and military, and
repeatedly throughout subsequent communiques.174
Each of these fabrications may be treated as premises,
and AQ’s first big lie as the alleged conclusion.
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Premise 1: The Murderer of Muslim Millions. The
United States is directly or indirectly responsible for
the murder of millions of Muslim men, women, and
children.
Premise 2: The Apostate Installer-Defender. The
United States rules directly or indirectly through antiMuslim apostate governments it installs, maintains,
and defends throughout the Muslim world.
Premise 3: The Imperialist-Exploiter. The United
States maintains a purely imperialist, exploitative,
and predatory relationship to Middle East oil supplies
and is pillaging the wealth of the Muslim world.
Premise 4: The Aggressive Permanent Occupier. U.S.led military operations in Afghanistan, and earlier
Iraq, and at present throughout the Muslim world,
are militant offensive wars motivated by a desire to
destroy Islam, permanently occupy Muslim lands,
or rule indirectly through anti-Muslim apostate
governments.
Premise 5: The U.S.-Zionist Plot to Create Israel to
Divide and Destroy the Umma. The state of Israel was
created as part of a Western colonial plot to establish a
Crusader-Zionist beachhead at the center of the Muslim world to divide, weaken, and eventually uproot
Islam from Palestine and the greater Middle East.
Steadfast U.S. support for Israel is motivated primarily by that anti-Muslim colonial intention.
These five fabrications have gone essentially unchallenged to the present day. Whether refuting them
is considered the equivalent of refuting holocaust deniers or 9/11 truthers, or flat-earthers, or martialing
facts has lost out to the so-called “battle of ideas,” not
taking these as deadly serious in the context of the
USG credibility deficit, over the course of a decade,
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has permitted fictions to become living legends with
predictably deadly consequences.175 If one chooses,
one can also use concepts derived from framing theory176 to perceive these five fabrications as alleged
empirical nodes supporting AQ’s anti-American
“injustice frame.” By effectively countering these
fabrications, one obliterates the supporting tissue of
this injustice frame that inspires moral outrage and
animates recruits.
It is not a far stretch to see how an angry, newlyinspired, morally-outraged young recruit could be led
through the lens of AQ’s sophisticated propaganda to
see present U.S. policy commitments as motivated primarily by anti-Muslim animus. Instead of privileging
access to oil reserves, the United States is a pillagerexploiter (Premise 3). Instead of a very powerful lobby
in defense of Israel’s security and expansion, which
in effect, permits an illegal occupation, settlement,
and continuing humiliation of the Palestinian people
to persist, the United States has an ultimate divide
and conquer strategy (Premise 5). Instead of a policy
that privileges conservative, stability-promoting antidemocratic autocrats and monarchs, the United States
is an apostate installer-defender (Premise 2).
Objective, factual, historical evidence is all that is
required to refute AQ’s five fabrications (premises) and
first big lie (conclusion). A sound argument consists of
true and relevant premises from which a conclusion
necessarily follows. It will be essential that such facts
are considered credible, thus requiring credible messengers and media, for their legitimacy.
While U.S. analysts are certainly capable of discovering, arranging, and communicating such facts,
a curiously powerful messenger and source of credibility should also be leveraged: committed Islamists
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whose militant bona fides are unassailable, but who
offer decisive evidence refuting AQ’s fabricated propagandistic history of U.S. involvement in the Arab
and Muslim world. Consider the following realistic
rather than propagandistic account provided by leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group (Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya)—opposed on grounds of principle, legality,
and pragmatics to AQ’s terroristic modus operandi—
of U.S. core strategic interests and their implications
for U.S. relations with the Islamic world.
The conception that America is waging a Crusade
against Muslims is not true. . . . in the worst of cases
[one can say that] at times there have been American
policies that have had a religious dimension in opposing some—and not all—of the Islamic world’s causes.
[The fact that this is not a Crusade] explains America’s positive stand in support of the Afghani mujahideen in their fight against the Soviet occupation, and
[America’s] positive stand [against] the ethnic cleansing operation against the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the province of Kosovo. Likewise,
the conception that America aimed to bring down the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and could not have
been deterred from doing so is not true. Reality attests
to the fact that America attempted to come to terms
with the Taliban regime in order to realize common
strategic goals . . . and these attempts to come to an
understanding ran up against the Al-Qaeda organization’s actions, which were launched from Afghanistan
and targeted America, and which the Taliban authorities did not restrain.177 . . . America at that time was
looking for new strategies for a new century, and if the
Front [i.e., Al-Qaeda] and other interpreters of Islam
had adopted serious Islamic strategy that would have
given consideration to American interests together
with Islamic interests, this would have prevented the
continuation of this war or [at least] would have kept
it from taking on a comprehensive nature.178
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An earlier work authored by this same organization deeply critical of AQ179 provides an even broader,
in-depth account and rendering of key U.S. objectives
vis-à-vis the Muslim world.
In this chapter, the leaders of the Egyptian Al-Jama’ah
Al-Islamiyah review and assess strategy on the issues
of the Muslim world in an attempt to answer several
important questions necessitated by current world
events: Did U.S. strategy target the Muslim world or
not? Are we in a state of self-defense that allows AlQaida to do what it wants? The authors argue that
Al-Qaida’s interpretation of U.S. strategy is not accurate but is characterized, as they say, with unfairness.
The authors say that any observer of U.S. strategy will
find that the prime mover of this strategy is interests
and not the religious factor. This explains many major events in which the United States appeared to be
supportive of some Islamic issues, such as support for
the Afghan jihad in 1979 against the Soviet presence.
The leaders of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyya divide this
U.S. strategy into three phases. The first starts with the
end of the First World War in 1945 [sic] until the end
of the Cold War in December 1991 with the collapse
of the Soviet Union. The second phase begins in 1991
until the [1998] proclamation of the World Front to
Combat the Jews and the Crusaders [by AQ] and the
start of operations against the United States. The third
phase stretches from 11 September 2001 events to [the
present] date. At the end of their evaluation of the
U.S. strategy, the authors conclude that Al-Qa’ida’s
strategy was one of the most important factors that
hastened the formulation of this U.S. strategy that is
negative toward the Muslim world.180

Method for Refuting AQs Big Lie #2.
The War of Deeds is especially appropriate for
refuting AQ’s propaganda that it is the vanguard
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fighting a defensive war against a Crusader-Zionist
alliance. The five premises similarly service this conclusion; exposing the fabricated nature of those premises suffices then, to render this conclusion invalid.
Whereas the previous task requires refuting lies
that radically impugn USG credibility, the task here
is confirming facts that impugn AQ’s credibility. Because AQ fights in the name of Islam and defends its
actions in terms of a strict, classical interpretation of
the shari’a regulating the lawful waging of the jihad,
radically impugning AQ’s credibility means exposing
not only its empirical fabrications, but its legal-moral
violations, i.e., sinfulness.
Jurisprudence and Fiqh al-Jihad.
Far from fighting a defensive jihad against Crusaders, AQ is in fact a criminal terrorist enterprise
that is guilty of egregious violations of Islamic law,
including the commission of major sins such as: intentional homicide, deemed unpardonable on the Day of
Judgment; imprudent sacrificing of Muslim interests
throughout the world; and violating generally expected norms of humane conduct by using murder, force,
and fear to impose its will on others. Let us consider
each in turn.
The jihad of the sword (jihad bis saif)181 is strictly
regulated by classical sources of orthodox religious
authority. AQ claims to uphold faithfully the classical shari’a of lawful jihad by strictly adhering to the
path of al salaf al salih (the path followed by the “righteous” ancestors). These earliest companions of and
successors to Prophet Muhammad furnish for genuine salafists the normative ideal of righteous intention
and conduct, including the conduct of jihad. AQ also
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claims to strictly abide by an established body of law
(fiqh) transmitted by classical religious scholar-jurists
prescribing and regulating jihad fi sabil Allah (jihad in
the path of Allah). The most damaging case against
AQ arises when these shari’a sources are marshaled
to persuasively demonstrate that absolutely forbidden (haram) violations have been perpetrated. Should
AQ’s terroristic modus operandi demonstrate discontinuity, innovation, and forbidden acts that contradict
Prophet Muhammad’s “sunna”—though marketed in
AQ apologetics as the “salafi-jihadi” path—its violation of the classical jihad would be proven, and its legitimacy impaled.182
Devastating cases against AQ’s violations of fiqh
al-jihad exist, and should be fully leveraged to prove
that AQ is guilty of murderous jihadism and has in
fact innovated a doctrine of “killing in masse” predicated on engaging in many legally/morally forbidden acts. Among these forbidden acts are: the killing
of several categories of person—Muslim and nonMuslim—whose blood, reputation, and property are
strictly protected under Islamic law; violation of the
shari’a regulating the use of human shields in combat; violation of the law of retribution or lex talionis;
violation of laws forbidding treachery and the breaking of covenants; and killing persons on the basis of
nationality.183
Prudence and Muslim Interests.
Prudential critiques are also key to obliterating
AQ’s propaganda, which asserts it fights on behalf
of Muslims and is essential to the defense of Islamic
lands and power. To the contrary, AQ’s murderous
jihadism is responsible for a host of consequences.
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What follows is a short list. AQ has caused the fall of
the Taliban regime. It has besmirched a great faith, Islam, by equating it in the minds of a broader public
with barbaric terror. AQ’s actions have created greater
support for a securitized environment that has placed
Muslims, and others, in a far more precarious position
vis-à-vis the free exercise of civil liberties, than previously. AQ has de-legitimized the broader Islamist
resurgence in the minds of a broader public seeking
along with other actors, to democratically contest
existing unpopular, autocratic regimes. Fiqh al-jihad
requires that the decision to wage the jihad of the
sword take into account the probability of success, the
relative benefits and costs to Islam of the choice to use
force, and takes full advantage of many other permissible and recommendable means that may be used to
spread the worship and Word of Allah.184
Ethics and Human Morality.
AQ’s use of murder, force, and fear—the essence
of its modus operandi as a criminal terrorist organization—denies human individuals, Muslim and
non-Muslim, the right to choose alternative paths
and means for realizing aspirations in the contemporary world. Terror as a fear-generating tool designed
to instill dread in order to attain power over others
undermines the fundamental sense of personal security: a security without which the exercise of freedom and liberty is not possible.185 AQ is, at its root,
in permanent war with any and all Muslims and
non-Muslims, who dissent from its path of murderous
jihadism.
Despite opposition to USG policies, overwhelming
majorities of Muslim and non-Muslim alike view ter-
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rorism as a morally reprehensible means for achieving
power over others. They view nonviolent, democratic
means as a superior means of fighting for one’s rights
and freedoms, as well as for selecting representatives
who are replaceable and accountable to the governed.
These overwhelming majorities do not view democracy as a substitute religion involving a worshipful
relation or replacement of an Almighty by man. Rather, they view democracy as the most effective means
of ensuring that man, as a morally challenged being
fraught with vices and temptations and desires, be
subject to accountable laws and governments, and not
the tyranny of an unchosen dictator, or self-appointed
vanguard. The “take away” message for the USG of
this most American of ideals—self-determination under an elected and accountable government under
law—seems obvious. “Better relations with Arab societies as a whole,” Jamal Amay of Princeton’s Department of Politics, recently asserts:186
will require reconsidering U.S. policies that ignore the
preferences of ordinary citizens, such as continuing to
back authoritarian regimes, increasing drone attacks
in the region, and supporting the ongoing Israeli occupation of the West Bank. A carefully constructed
foreign policy will have to take into account the preferences of millions of Arabs across the region. . . .
There is no evidence of some deep and durable Arab
hatred of the United States. . . . [C]itizens across the
region recognize that there is much to gain from closer
ties to the United States. A carefully designed U.S.
foreign policy should ensure that the United States’
geostrategic plans incorporate, rather than alienate,
those citizens.187

The “take away” message for AQ is also clear. AQ’s
insurgent terror is now, and into an indefinite but
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certain future, in irreconcilable conflict with this vast
majority’s sense of decency, morality, and its chosen
path forward. Imploding from within, and marginalized from without, AQ shall in time meet the fate—
oblivion—of every known terrorist enterprise. Having
wreaked havoc now for nearly a quarter century, it is
well time for those possessed of facts, to fight AQ’s
fabrications. The time for a determined, systematic
counterpropaganda counteroffensive fought along
the lines suggested above, has arrived.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY
Ways, Means, and Ends.
Strategy entails that one specify the way in which
means are used to accomplish ends.188 The end specified in in this monograph is the second strategic objective outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report: countering
radicalization and recruitment to AQ. The way is the
concept or method for achieving that strategic objective. In this case, I am suggesting that U.S. strategists
use a unique way/methodology: Fighting the War of
Deeds. This methodology emphasizes the communicative nature, function, and value of policies, deeds,
and actions as drivers of anti-Americanism in the
Arab and Muslim world. This method is offered as a
distinct supplement, complement, or most likely substitute, for what I deem a mostly ill-advised effort to
craft persuasive messaging using public diplomacy,
strategic communication, or other persuasive arts that
do not begin with and leverage the power of deeds.
The means suggested involve all eight instruments of national power described above. If policy
is communication, each of these instruments must
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function in harmony to undermine AQ’s two greatest
lies. A range of agencies and personnel are focused
on countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ,
and “means” therefore applies to all organizational,
financial, and personnel-based resources that must be
deployed to realize this objective.
Strategic Validity.
The validity of a strategy requires that it accomplish its desired strategic effect (suitability), is backed
by sufficient resources (sustainability), and is deemed
legitimate, relative to costs and benefits, among relevant publics (acceptability). Assuming resource sufficiency, I here address the first and third elements.
Suitability. The analysis above confirms the resounding emphasis—across a range of experts, literature, reports, and political orientations—of the critical
significance of deeds as communication. The methodology of Fighting the War of Deeds is therefore grounded in known facts and experience regarding the variety of modes available in persuasive communication,
and the suitability/efficacy of deeds as chief among
them. The War of Deeds is especially suited for the
present propaganda-rich environment in which countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ among
morally indignant, home-based and home-grown terrorist self-starters has become critical. The overriding
emphasis on perceptions of U.S. injustice toward the
Muslim world among this population requires that
policies speak loudly and powerfully enough to quell
doubts and undermine AQ’s viral reach.
Acceptability. The War of Deeds is likely to meet
resistance among certain sub-populations who consider themselves beneficiaries of present U.S. foreign
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and military policy in the Arab and Muslim world. It is
also likely to meet resistance among a broader American populace who may believe that carefully examining U.S. foreign and military policy, and perceptions
of that policy amount to “rewarding” terrorism. It will
require a determined effort to prove that, in fact, one
may develop new understandings without sanctioning terrorism or AQ’s murderous jihadism, as a legitimate means of addressing existing injustices. Taking
the initiative to clarify and define present policies and
their implications for future relations with the Arab
and Muslim world is highly advisable; fighting an illdefined “war of ideas” as a reaction to AQ’s bloody
provocations and perfidious methods, is not.
Strategic Risks.
Strategic risk must consider the probable consequences of success and failure of a given strategy. It
asks the question: Given this unique strategy, and in
the context of this strategic environment, what strategic effects are likely to be created by the implementation of this strategy? Many other questions must also
be raised: How will this strategy affect the present
equilibrium among actors? What potential unintended effects, and second- and third-order effects, exist?
CONCLUSION
I will close this monograph on a note of genuine
humility and state that I must leave to genuine strategists the careful, methodical evaluation of these potential risks arising from vigorously fighting a War of
Deeds as proposed here. It is my firm conviction that
the United States of America is—owing to its youthful
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18th century provenance and pioneering role as creator, defender, and promoter of democratic ideals—
on the right side of history, while AQ faces inexorable
implosion and marginalization and an inevitable demise. Its global ambitions, murderous methods, and
arrogant pretensions condemn it to wreaking havoc
and parasitizing chaos. I firmly believe that the long
process of reconstructing states, legitimacy, and
boundaries now unfolding throughout the fermenting
Arab and Muslim world naturally benefits the United
States, and we, them. We are both, we are all, aspiring to realize, and not negate, functioning, productive, sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociocultural
orders. For those reasons, it seems to me that the risk
of not acting boldly to proclaim an enduring alliance
with this emergent order and its Sunni majority is
far greater than the risks we face, as nation after nation deposes its autocrats and dictators and possibly
also its monarchs. Must we, having failed to develop
a post-autocratic, post-Cold War vision, vacillate between embracing the autocrats who guarantee shortterm regime stability and the democrats—Muslim
and secular—who seek to dethrone them? I believe
a natural, long-term alliance and dialogue of civilizations is in the making and that possibly the greatest risk of all is failing to understand that the older
algorithm—oil, Israel, and autocracy—does not give
way to a fuller conception. One, in short, that does not
require lipstick.
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2012, available from www.stripes.com. Or, to the contrary, that in
general opposition to drones is highly variable and, in fact, mostly
muted, assuming unintended civilian noncombatant deaths are
kept to the barest minimum, among those most directly victimized by AQ and its allies and affiliates. See e.g., Greg Miller, “In
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self-defense under international law, Congress’s authorization of
the use of all necessary and appropriate military force against this
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See Bill Roggio, “US drones kill 5 AQAP operatives in Yemen,”
Long War Journal, August 1, 2013, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/us_drones_kill_5_aqa_1.php.
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New York: Pergamon Press, 1982, pp. 325-346) provides the rationale for such a focus on controlling opportunity (p. 325):
Some portions of the phenomenon of terrorism are clearly
explained by the frustrations and injustices of our society
and by the sociology or psychology of the individuals then
driven to enlist in terrorist groups. Other portions of terrorist activity stem from technological or social changes which
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147. Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for
the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace:
A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab
& Muslim World, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State,
October 1, 2003, p. 9, available from www.state.gov/documents/
organization/2488s.pdf. The unenviable Machiavellianism required
to “sell” such policies seems the task of this particular advisory
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group. For example, on one hand, they state, “We must also confront the contradiction that troubles believers in democracy and
liberalization. They see official U.S. diplomacy as frequently buttressing governments hostile to freedom and prosperity.” So what
is the role of public diplomacy in such a situation, one might ask?
The answer (p. 18) is:
Public diplomacy gives the United States the opportunity
to supplement the support of such regimes—often a policy
necessity—with broader, long-term promotion of universal
values and economic, political, and social reforms that directly support public aspirations.

See pp. 19-24 also, for what to this author are similarly contradictory and unconvincing attempts to espouse and defend values
that are directly undermined by present policy commitments. Another similarly unconvincing set of reports admits on one hand
the importance of policy, yet seeks on the other to “put lipstick on
pigs” through effective communications. It states:
Although this paper does not tackle the U.S. foreign and
domestic policy issues that drive global and Islamic world
public perceptions of America, it does acknowledge that our
policies are central determinants of global views. Nonetheless, how we communicate, including methods and our posture of humility—or lack thereof—remains a central part of
how we tackle the problems of public diplomacy and it is
these methods that this paper will examine.

See Hady Amr, The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S.
Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper #6, Washington, DC: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, January 2004, p. 8. See also Hady Amr and P. W.
Singer, Restoring America’s Good Name: Improving Strategic Communications with the Islamic World, Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, August 2006, available from www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2006/09/middleeast-amr; Hady Amr and P. W. Singer,
Engaging the Muslim World: A Communication Strategy to Win the
War of Ideas, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, April
2007. For an outstanding, insightful, starkly contrasting approach
supporting a transformation in U.S. policies toward support for
the democratic and reformist Islamist forces rather than efforts to
mask present contradictions pitting pro-authoritarian or author-
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itarian-tolerant policy and democratic rhetoric, see Abdelwahab
el-Affendi, The Conquest of Muslim Hearts and Minds? Perspectives
on U.S. Reform and Public Diplomacy Strategies, Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution, September 1, 2005, available from
www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2005/09/islamicworld-el-affendi.
For example, el-Affendi, remarks (p. 2): “The link between Islamism and terrorism is at best contingent. The problem, in fact,
relates more to widespread anti-Americanism based on some U.S.
policies or popular perceptions of them.” In reference to the present crisis of U.S. credibility and public diplomacy (p. 2):
The starting point of this process [reforming US public diplomacy] is the recognition of the dysfunctional role, lack
of legitimacy, and unrepresentativeness that characterizes
the state as a structure in much of the Muslim world. This
condition is demonstrated by the primacy of the U.S. public
diplomacy campaign, which is directed toward the general
Muslim public, rather than the governments in the Muslim
world. This indicates the existence of a moral and institutional vacuum at the heart of the region’s political landscape.

See also “A Credibility Problem,” pp. 7-10.
148. The Arab-Israel confrontation, and more specific Palestinian struggle for national rights and against occupation, is one
of the most significant historical sources of modern terrorism. See
Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, “Historical Background: Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology,” Washington, DC: Department of State, 2013, available
from www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html; Judith Colp Rubin
and Caroline Taillandier, “Appendix: Chronology of Middle EastConnected Terrorism Against Americans [c. 1961-2001],” Barry
Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, eds., Anti-American Terrorism and
the Middle East: A Documentary History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 351-366.
149. Further confidence in this conclusion arises from the
fact that it is by no means a radical opinion maintained by an unhinged fringe of the political left or right. Rather, this conclusion
is arrived at by persons with varying sorts of commitments and
institutional affiliation, e.g., Arab and Muslim academics, nonArab and non-Muslim academics and analysts, U.S. military and
intelligence analysts, and persons of varying political ideologi134

cal orientations. For a very brief but indicative sampling beyond
those already summarized, see Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, The
Other Face of the Islamist Movement, Working Papers, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Global Policy Forum, Washington,
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 23, January 2003, esp. pp. 26-27, available from www.carnegieendowment.
org/files/wp33.pdf; Said Amir Arjomand, “Can Rational Analysis
Break a Taboo: A Middle Eastern Perspective,” Eric Hershberg
and Kevin W. Moore, Critical Views of September 11: Analyses from
Around the World, New York, Social Science Research Council,
The New Press, pp. 162-176; Robert Art and Louise Richardson,
eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism: lessons from the past, “Conclusion,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press,
esp. pp. 592-596; Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda, Updated edition, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2008 (orig. 2006), esp. pp. 294-298; Martha Crenshaw,
“Why America? The Globalization of Civil War,” Current History,
December 2001, pp. 425-432; Robert Fisk, “Our Actions in the
Middle East are What is Endangering Our Security,” The Independent, November 6, 2010, available from www.commondreams.org/
view/2010/11/06-2?print; Graham E. Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002, available from www.
foreignaffairs.com/print/57806; Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests, Cambridge, UK,
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Simon Haddad and Hilal Khashan, “Islam and Terrorism: Lebanese Muslim
Views on September 11,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No.
6, December 2002, pp. 812-828; Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan,
“Key Considerations in Counterideological Work against Terrorist Ideology,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2006,
esp. pp. 548-549; Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Without
Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, esp. pp. 284-285; Michael B. Meyer, Major,
USAF, America’s Credibility at Stake: Arab Perceptions of US Foreign
Policy, A Research Report Submitted to Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements, Maxwell Air Force Base,
AL: Air and Staff Command College, Air University, March 19,
2002; Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism,” Eric Hershberg and
Kevin W. Moore, Critical Views of September 11, pp. 44-60; Major
Roy P. Matur, USAF, Influencing Transnational Terrorist Organizations: Using Influence Nets to Prioritize Factors, June 2005, Graduate
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Research Project in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of Masters of
Operational Sciences, AFIT/GOS/ENS/05-06, Wright-Patterson
Air Force Base, OH: Air University, Department of the Air Force,
Air Force Institute of Technology, esp. pp. iv, 16-31, available
from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/afit/fatur_influences_terrorists.
pdf; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Recent U.S. Thinking About Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2010, Vol.
22, esp. 647; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005; Robert Pape
and J. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Suicide Terrorism
and How to Stop It, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010;
PEW Global Attitudes Project, December 19 2001; Marc Sageman,
Leaderless Jihad: Terrorist networks in the 21st Century, Philadelphia,
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, esp. p. 35-36; Brent
J. Talbot and Michael B. Meyer, View from the East: Arab Perceptions of United States Presence and Policy, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Occassional Paper No. 48, USAF Academy,
CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, February 2003;
Sherifa Zuhur, Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Muslims Through the War of Ideas, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2008, available from www.
StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, esp. p. 118.
150. See also Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda, note 72, pp.
59-64 (Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the future of terrorism, Boston, MA: Northeastern University
Press, 1999, “Appendix Three: A letter from Ramzi Yousef and the
other conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing, published
as received by The New York Times 4 days after the February 1993
explosion,” pp. 274-275): “Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993
World Trade Center plot, as well as others, including the initial
planning of the ‘Planes Operation’—who had earlier failed in an
attempt to bomb the Israeli embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, and
whose initial New York targets were not the World Trade Center
but targeting Jewish neighborhoods in Crown Heights and Williamsburg— had this to say as a final statement following his conviction for that crime:
We are, the fifth battalion in the Liberation Army, declare
our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned
building. This action was done in response for the American political, economical and military support to Israel the
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state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in
the region.
Our demands:
Stop all military, economical, and political aids [sic] to Israel.
All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop.
Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries [sic]
interior affairs.
. . . The terrorism that Israel practices (which is supported
by America) must be faced with a similar one. The dictatorship and terrorism (also supported by America) that some
countries are practicing against their own people must also
be faced with terrorism.
The American people must know, that their civilians
who got killed are not better than those who are getting
killed by the American weapons and support.
The American people are responsible for the actions of
their government and they must question all of the crimes
that their government is committing against other people.
Or they – Americans – will be the targets of our operations
that could diminish them.
We invite all of the people from all countries and all of
the revolutionaries in the world to participate in this action
with us to accomplish our just goals.
‘IF THEN ANYONE TRANSGRESSES THE PROHIBITION AGAINST YOU TRANSGRESS YE LIKEWISE
AGAINST HIM. . . .
				Al-Farbek Al-Rokn,
				Abu Bakr Al-Makee

CNN, in its write-up of the final verdict, represented facts
by stating: “After 3 days of deliberation in November, a federal
jury convicted Yousef and Eyad Ismoil on murder and conspiracy
charges for their roles in a plot by Islamic extremists to topple the
trade centers two 110-story [sic] towers to punish the United States
for its support of Israel,” available from articles.cnn.com/1998-0108/us/980108 yousef 1 trade-center-bombing-yousef-and-eyad-ismoilconviction-S=PM:US. Finally, at least one of the East Africa Embassy bombers made his motives known in published transcripts
of the case (See United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al.,
S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, United States District Court, Southern District of
New York, New York, N.Y., October 18, 2001, Sentencing hearing,
available from fl1.findlaw.com/news/findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/
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usbinldn101801.) El Hage’s complicity in the attacks was proved,
but based on his testimony one learns that policy, not shari’a, primarily motivated him; also, that the killing of innocent human beings—something he apparently did not know would happen—is
absolutely unacceptable under Islamic law. The defendants, Wadih El Hage, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud
Al-‘Owhali, and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, all received life
without parole: Odeh’s views (see p. 112) are referred to by Judge
Leonard B. Sand when he states as their motives, “Mr. Odeh’s
opposition to United States’ support of Israel, financially, politically and militarily, [and] presence of the United States military
in the holy lands of Saudi Arabia, [and] the Persian Gulf and the
Horn of Africa . . .” At p. 113, Judge Sands states: “The attack may
have been intended to attack American foreign policy, but the victims were innocent people. . . .” At pp. 115-116, the distinction
is made between support of al-Qaeda’s military goals and deep
regret at loss of innocent civilian life. Odeh’s attorney, Anthony L.
Ricco, states:
He is now prepared to face the sentence that the court must
impose here. He is very much aware of the substantial human loss that occurred here. He is not oblivious to the fact
that many people were injured and many people died here
who were innocent. He acknowledged that very early on
in the case when he was interrogated. He has always expressed that. He does not have remorse, your Honor, about
his participation in Al Qaeda. That’s a difference in his
mind. . . . Mohamed Odeh has always stated that he was not
a part of the execution of the bombing. He continues in that
position today, but that does not mean, your Honor, that
he is a person who is oblivious to the great loss of human
life and the great injury that was inflicted upon people here
(pp. 115-116).

El-Hage, a second defendant, addressed the Court before his sentencing with a very revealing, fundamentalist narrative, but one
that appears to recognize the enormity of killing innocents and
indeed one that exhibits moral revulsion. His view of the United
States is positive from a Muslim perspective: he repeatedly refers
to the United States as a land where Islam can be freely spread
and practiced (“Others chose to migrate to other countries, such
as the U.S., where they can spread the message of Islam freely
and in the same time support their brothers and sisters who are
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continuing their efforts to apply God’s rules in the Islamic countries,” p. 139); also: “Islam became the fastest growing religion in
the U.S., as it is in the whole world, all praise be to God first, and
to the tolerant, open society here” (p. 139); also:
Now, even though the Islamic system and way of life is for
the best of all humanity [sic], devout Muslims, as I believe,
are not asking to apply it here in the U.S., where Muslims
are less than 7 million. They are a minority. The fact is that
they want to apply it in the Islamic countries where the majority are Muslims. But in those countries, today’s selfish,
arrogant and self-deceited kings, presidents and rulers want
to apply their own self-invented rules . . . [T]o make the long
story short [sic], by the 20th century, the rulers started to
neglect the Koranic laws, substituting them with manmade
[sic] laws. The result is what we see today. Muslim nations
are the weakest, poorest and most miserable. That is why,
in my opinion, we find devout, committed Muslims, individuals and groups, working actively to reimplement God’s
rules and guidance (pp. 137-138).

As for moral revulsion: “[D]evout Muslims, . . even in time of
conflict, they should not exceed certain limits, harming innocent
people or noncombatant ones. This is very stressed upon [sic] in
the Koran and the teachings of the prophet Muhammad, peace
be upon him, who even prohibited destroying crops, animals or
property at time of war” (p. 139); and again:
When the bombings happened in Africa in ’98, my opinion
was that that action was extreme and not in accordance with
the beliefs that I learned. I made my opinion clear well before I was arrested or charged. Today, my opinion is still the
same towards what happened in Africa and what happened
here last month (September 11, 2001 [9/11]. The killing of
innocent people and noncombatant is radical, extreme and
cannot be tolerated by any religion, principles, beliefs or values. Today I can stand here and say that I did not participate
or support any extreme conduct or any act that violates my
beliefs as a devout Muslim...(pp. 141-142).

El-Hage, at pp. 142-143, identifies “many American policies
towards Muslim countries [that] are wrong” including the alleged
“over one million child [sic] and thousands of innocent people”
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affected by the embargo on Iraq; “the unconditional support of
the American government to the Israeli government that is killing innocent Palestinians, taking their land, expelling them and
destroying their homes” (p. 142); the effect on deeply religious
Muslims of “having non-Muslim troops on the land of Muslims’
holiest sites, its negative impact on Muslim masses around the
world and specifically those on the Arabian Peninsula” (p. 142).
He goes on to also say though:
Such policies, in my opinion, are wrong and end up breeding
unjustified extremism. . . . Many Muslims and non-Muslims
have expressed the same views. That includes the American
Muslim community, which I am a member of, which is free
to voice its criticism to the American policy [sic] but without
committing or supporting any extreme acts (pp. 142-143).

In his defense, he also states: “I am still the person who avoids
radical solutions and acts, as I did in the past” (p. 145). (El-Hage
had at that time no prior record of any violent or illegal activity.)
151. Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out.”
152. Obama, “The Future of our Fight Against Terrorism.”
153. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010, As Amended
Through 15 April 2012, Washington, DC: DoD; from JP 3-13-2.
154. A very insightful analysis of a triangular structure that
links violence or the threat of violence, mass communication, and
feelings of chronic fear (terror), can be found in Alex P. Schmid,
“The Response Problem as a Definition Problem,” Terrorism and
Political Violence, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 7-13, especially p. 10, Figure
1, “The Triangle of Insurgent Terrorism” (original source: A. P.
Schmid and J. de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982,
p. 176); and Alex P. Schmid, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing
Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer
2004, pp. 197-221, esp. “Terrorism as/and Communication,” pp.
205-210. The key role of mass media in transmitting terrorist signals explains how “deeds themselves,” if propagated like waves
beyond their initial victims to the ultimate target, is the focus here.
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It is this mediated function then that permits terror to function
as tactic and political strategy. See also Thomas Perry Thornton,
“Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,” Harry Eckstein, ed.,
Internal War: Problems and Approaches, New York, The Free Press,
1964, pp. 71-99; Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Analysing Terrorism and
Counter-Terrorism: A Communication Model,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2002, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 77-122; Andrew H. Kydd
and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International
Security, 2006, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 49-80; Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political Violence,
1993, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 213-251. For the original formulations of
the notion “propaganda of the deed,” see John Most, “Advice for
Terrorists,” (orig. in Freiheit, September 13, 1884), “Action as Propaganda,” Walter Laqueur and Yohah Alexander, eds., The Terrorism Reader, New York: Meridian, pp. 100-108, especially Part
III, “Action as Propaganda,” pp. 105-106.
155. A recent “controversy” involving Bruce Hoffman and
Marc Sageman led, in my opinion, to a false dichotomy; that
radicalization and recruitment is either exclusively top-down
(Hoffman) or exclusively via the emergence of self-radicalizers
and home-based and home-grown persons primarily initially
morally outraged by AQ propaganda or personal or vicarious
identification with other’s humiliation and suffering. For these
overly-polarized positions, see Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of
Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,” Review Essay, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008; “The Leaderless Jihad’s Leader: Why Osama Bin Laden Mattered,” Foreign Affairs,
May 13, 2011, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/print/67785;
Bruce Hoffman, “A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama
Administration,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2009, Vol. 21,
pp. 359-377. In Hoffman’s more recent writings, however, one
encounters a more diversified enemy that accommodates varying relations between core, affiliated, and inspired. See, e.g.,
Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, and Katherine Tiedemann, “Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America and American Interests,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2011, Vol. 34, pp. 65-101;
and Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda’s Uncertain Future,” Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, 2013, Vol. 36, pp. 635-653. For Sageman’s
position, see Marc Sageman, “Response to Hoffman’s Review Essay ‘The Myth of Grassroots Terrorism’”; Marc Sageman, “Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan and
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Beyond,” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, DC, October 7, 2009, available from www.foreign.
senate.gov/hearings/confronting-al-Qaeda-understanding-the-threatin-afghanistan-and-beyond; reprinted in Perspectives on Terrorism,
December 2009, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 4-25; Rick Maze, “Researcher:
Most terrorist plots have no al-Qaida link,” Army Times, October
19, 2009, p. 14; Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks,
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004; Marc
Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First
Century, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
156. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. viii, 3, 11, 13, 22, 24, 25,
143-146.
157. See, for examples, Colonel G. L. Lamborn, USAR
(Ret.), “Jihad of the Pen: A Practioners Guide to Conducting
Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency,” Small Wars
Journal, February 2010, 122 pp., esp. pp. 67-72, available from
www.smallwarsjournal.com; Christian Clai and Major Marc Romanych, USA (Retired), “Counterpropaganda: An Important Capability for Joint Forces,” IO Sphere, Fall 2005, pp. 11-13; Michael
Egner, “Social Science Foundations for Strategic Communications
in the Global War on Terrorism,” Paul Davis and Kim Cragin,
eds., Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together,
Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2009, Chap. 9, pp.
323-365, esp. pp. 327-330; Colonel W. C. Garrison, “Information
Operations and Counter-Propaganda: Making a Weapon of Public Affairs,” Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army
War College, March 17, 1999; Cori E. Dauber, “The TRUTH is out
there: Responding to Insurgent Disinformation and Deception
Operations,” Military Review, January-February 2009, pp. 13-24;
Todd Leventhal, Iraqi Propaganda and Disinformation During the
Gulf War: Lessons for the Future, The Emirates Occasional Papers,
No. 36, Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1999; Droukje Demant and Beatrice De Graaf,
“How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization
Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals,” Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33, 2010, pp. 408-428; Beatrice de Graaf,
“Counter-Narratives and the Unrehearsed Stories Counter-Terrorists Unwittingly Produce,” Perspectives on Terrorism, August
2009, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 5-11; Larisa Breton and Adam Pearson,
“Contextual Truth-Telling to Counter Extremist-Supportive Mes-
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saging Online: The Wikileaks ‘Collateral Murder’ Case Study,
Small Wars Journal, November 6, 2010, available from www.smallwarsjournal.com; Nancy Snow, “Public Diplomacy and Propaganda: Rethinking Diplomacy in the Age of Persuasion,” December 4,
2012; See also Leonard W. Doob, “Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, Autumn 1950,
pp. 419-442, esp. p. 441, for the critical observation that no matter
how masterful the propagandist, facts can be very troublesome
things. Doob states, for example:
Goebbels clearly recognized his own propaganda impotency in six situations. The basic drives of sex and hunger were
not appreciably affected by propaganda. Air raids brought
the problems ranging from discomfort to death which could
not be gainsaid. Propaganda could not significantly increase
industrial production. The religious impulses of many Germans and by peoples of the occupied countries required
forceful action, not clever words. Finally, Germany’s unfavorable military situation became an undeniable fact. When
propaganda and censorship could not be effective, Goebbels
advocated action or, in one of his official positions . . . he
himself produced the action. Diversionary propaganda he
considered second-best.

158. The terms “Psychological Operations” and “PSYOPS”
are entirely deleted from JP 1-02.
159. Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces
Unconventional Warfare, Washington, DC: DoD, September 2008,
p. 4-14, para 4-74.
160. Information Operations Primer, p. 4.
161. JP 3-13.2.
162. This essential function and its potential evacuation or
confusion in the term, Military Information Support Operations
and its acronym MISO led to spirited debate among PSYOP personnel. See, for example, Alfred Paddock, Jr., “PSYOP: On a Complete Change in Organization, Practice, and Doctrine,” Small Wars
Journal, June 2010; Alfred E. Paddock, “Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 56, 1st Quarter, 2010, pp. 89-93; See Lawrence Dietz, “MISO: Is it Soup Yet?”
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available from psyopregiment.blogspot.com/2010/06/miso-is-it-soupyet.html and its many replies; “Psyop expert discusses military
information support operations,” Washington, DC: The Institute
of World Politics, March 9, 2011, available from www.iwp.edu/
news_publications/detail/psyop-expert-discusses-military-informationsupport-operations; Kevin Maurer, “Psychological Operations are
now Military Information Support Operations,” Associated Press,
July 2, 2010, available from publicintelligence.net/psychological-operations-are-now-military-information-support-operations/; and more
generally, from www.psywarrior.com.
163. See, for example, Kelton Rhoads, Introduction to Influence,
1997-2012, Working Psychology, available from www.workingpsychology.com; Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran,
Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H. Schwartz, and
Cathryn Q. Thurston, Foundations of Effective Influence Operations:
A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities, Santa Monica, CA:
The RAND Corporation, 2009, esp. p. xiii, 1-7, for influence operations broadly and counterpropaganda, and p. 6, for critical
significance of actions; Lieutenant Colonel Susan L. Gough, “The
Evolution of Strategic Influence,” Strategy Research Project, April
7, 2003, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, p.1, for definition of
strategic influence, and pp. 8, 9, 29, esp. 30-37, for role of counterpropaganda; Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror:
Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism, Santa Monica,
CA: The RAND Corporation, 2005; Paul K. Davis, Simple Models
to Explore Deterrence and More General Influence in the War with alQaeda, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010; Alex S.
Wilner, “Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimation in Counterterrorism,” Amos Perlmutter Prize Essay,
The Journal of Strategic Studies, February 2011, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp.
3-37; Dr. Lee Rowland and Commander Steve Tatham, RN, “Strategic Communication & Influence Operations: Do We Really Get
‘It’?,” www.smallwarsjournal.com, August 3, 2010; “Influence Operations,” Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Cyberspace
& Information Study Center, available from www.au.af.mil/infoops/influence.htm; Major Roy P. Fatur, USAF, “Influencing Transnational Terrorist Organizations: Using Influence Nets to Prioritize Factors,” June 2005, Graduate Research Project, Maxwell Air
Force Base, AL: Air University, Air Force Institute of Technology.
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164. See Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare,
Beijing, China: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999, esp. pp. 51-56, and 191-194, for conceptions of methods
and means, and their infinite combinations, extending well beyond those traditionally conceived; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Partial translation.
165. Cheng Hang Teo, Major, Republic of Singapore Air
Force, The Acme of Skill: Nonkinetic Warfare, Wright Flyer Paper
No. 30, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, May 2008, p. 1.
166. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, esp.
pp. 56-57; See also esp. pp. 7, 12, 50-57, 56-57, 115, endnotes #27#29, pp. 112-113; 117, 119-120, 128-129, 168-69, 180-181, 216, and
221. See also Major Michael J. Good, USA, Chinese National Strategy of Total War, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Air
Force Institute of Technology, June 2008, in partial fulfillment for
the Degree of Master of Science in Cyber Warfare, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, see esp. pp. 3-12 on doctrine of total
war—war across all domains and battlefields from Sun Tzu, Mao,
Deng Xiaoping, and others; pp. 13-33, esp. p. 28 for battlefields/
conduct of total war; pp. 34-48, Cyber Space in the Total War;
and, Conclusions, pp. 49-53, available from handle.dtic.mil/100.2/
ADA487635. See also James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, in recent Congressional testimony, states:
This year [2013], in both content and organization, . . . illustrates how quickly and radically the world—and our threat
environment—are changing. The environment is demanding reevaluations of the way we do business, expanding
our analytic envelope, and altering the vocabulary of intelligence. Threats are more diverse, interconnected, and viral
than at any time in history. Attacks, which might involve
cyber and financial weapons, can be deniable and unattributable. Destruction can be invisible, latent, and progressive
(see also esp. pp. 1-3, analyzing the cyber domain).

Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.
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167. See, for example, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008, Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, pp. 2-1 to 2-11, available from www.
us.army.mil. See also Colonel Jack D. Kem (Retired), “Understanding the operational environment: the expansion of DIME,”Military
Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB), April-June 2007, Vol. 33,
No. 2, pp. 49-53, for a history of the coinage of DIME, DIMEFIL
(or MIDLIFE), and uneven adoption of the latter in various relatively recent publications.
168. Even and Siman-Tov, conceptualize cyberspace thusly:
The term ‘cyberspace’ defines a phenomenon that emerged
with the invention of the telegraph in 1844, which involves
taking advantage of the electromagnetic field for human
needs by means of technology. An essential turning point
in the development of cyberspace was the invention of the
numerical computer in 1949. Other milestones include: the
linking of communications networks with computers and
machines, which began in the 1970s; mass use of the internet
and personal computers since the mid-1990s; and in the past
decade, the comprehensive integration between computer
systems and various communications systems and machines (such as in industry, transportation, and other fields),
the mass use of handheld cellular devices, the flourishing of
social networks on the internet, and more. All of these have
profoundly influenced society and the economy. Information technologies and cyberspace are rapidly changing the
nature of the modern battlefield as well.

Cyber Warfare: Concepts and Strategic Trends, Memorandum 117,
Tel Aviv, Israel: INSS, May 2012, p. 9, available from www.inss.
org.il.
169. For example, for select press reporting existence of a cyber warfare doctrine, see Max Fisher, “Leaked documents hint
at Obama’s emerging cyberwar doctrine,” The Washington Post,
June 7, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com/blogs; Robert O’Harrow, Jr., and Barton Gellman, “Secret cyber directive
calls for ability to attack without warning,” The Washington Post,
June 7, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com; Cheryl Pellerin, “Cybercom Builds Teams for Offense, Defense in Cyberspace,” Washington, DC: DoD, March 12, 2013, available from
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www.defense.gov; Ellen Nakashima, “Pentagon creating teams to
launch cyberattacks as threat grows,” The Washington Post, March
12, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com; Jim Garamone,
“Clapper Places Cyber at Top of Transnational Threat List,”
Washington, DC: DoD, March 12, 2013, available from www.defense.gov; Dave Tolikar, “At Nellis AFB, teaching the shadowy
art of cyber warfare,” Stars & Stripes, available from www.stripes.
com; Jim Garamone, “NSA Chief: Cyber World Presents Opportunities, Challenges,” Washington, DC: DoD, available from www.
defense.gov. For select reports and analyses on various dimensions
of cyberspace as a warfare domain, see Department of Defense
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Washington, DC: DoD, July
2011, available from www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Cyber Power, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy
School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May
2010, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu_files/cyber_power.
pdf; Jon Brickey, Jacob Cox, John Nelson, and Gregory Conti, “The
Case for Cyber,” Small Wars Journal, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/13223; Gary D. Brown and Owen W. Tullos, “On the
Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations,” Small Wars Journal, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/13595; Michael N. Schmitt,
“International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn
Manual Juxtaposed,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 54,
December 2012, pp. 13-37; “The Tallin Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare,” Tallinn, Estonia: NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, available from
www.ccdcoe.org/249.html.
170. A possible mnemonic device is suggested in the following ordering and pronunciation of this eight-fold concept: DICEFILM (pronounced, “Dicey Film”).
171. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M.
Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, New York, Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2007.
172. This methodology is presently pursued by the Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), subordinate
to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
but, in fact, an interagency enterprise involving key elements of
the national security and intelligence communities. A brief summation of its activities is provided by Jo Becker and Scott Shane,
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“Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,”
The New York Times, in which the authors report: “a sophisticated,
interagency war room at the State Department to counter the jihadi narrative on an hour-by-hour basis, posting messages and
video online and providing talking points to embassies.” Consisting primarily of a re-purposed digital engagement team initially
tasked to the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism,
their mission is to enter terrorist venues, and comprised of a small
pool of personnel fluent in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and Somali, seek
to undermine AQ propaganda. For USG policy and enabling legislation, see USAID, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), Washington,
DC, 2010, Chap. 2, Adapting to the Diplomatic Landscape of the
21st Century, III. Engaging Beyond the State, 1. Public Diplomacy,
Shape the Narrative, Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships, (p. 62) Counter violent extremism, “Creating a Center for Counterterrorism Communications,” available from www.
state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/; Office of the President of the United States,
Executive Order # 13584, Developing an Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism Communications Initiative and Establishing a Temporary
Organization to Support Certain Government-Wide Communications
Activities Directed Abroad, Washington, DC: The White House,
September 9, 2011; Office of the President of the United States, Update to Congress on National Framework for Strategic Communication,
Washington, DC: The White House, 2012, available from www.
hsdl.org/?view&did=704809, in which the President defines the
Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications’ (CSCC’s)
three foci: “confronting al-Qa’ida rhetoric through direct digital
engagement . . . providing tools for United States Government
communicators; and working with specific U.S. Embassies’ country teams to develop plans for engagement at the local level” (pp.
6-7); U.S. Department of State, “Center for Strategic Communications,” Washington, DC: Department of State, available from
www.state.gov/r/cscc/; Richard LeBaron, “The State Department’s
Role in Countering Violent Extremism,” Prepared Remarks [only
a portion of the forum that was on the record], Policy Focus 119,
Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
November 18, 2011; Richard LeBaron, “Public Diplomacy as an Instrument of Counterterrorism: A Progress Report,” Speech, President’s Round Table, Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired
(DACOR), Washington, DC, DACOR Bacon House, June 20, 2012;
“Communicating with Terror: A Briefing and Discussion with the
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Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications,” Atlantic Council; “Ambassador Alberto Fernandez Appointed Coordinator of the CSCC, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State,
March 26, 2012; U. S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, The State Department’s Center
for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications: Mission, Operations
and Impact, Washington, DC: House of Representatives, 112th
Cong., Second Sess., Serial No. 112-164, August 2, 2012, available
from www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/; Ambassador Alberto M. Fernandez, Statement of Ambassador Alberto M. Fernandez, Coordinator
for the Center of Strategic Counterterrorism Communications before the
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation
and Trade, Washington, DC: August 2, 2012; For press accounts
and commentary, see “State, SOCOM Partner to Counter Cyberterrorism,” Stony Brook, NY: The Simons Center, June 6, 2012,
available from thesimonscenter.org/state-socom-partner-to-countercyberterrorism/; Philip Palin, “Text, subtext, and terrorism,” Homeland Security Watch, July 15, 2011; Helle C. Dale, “WebMemo,” No.
3348, August 31, 2011, “Congress Must Set High Bar for White
House Strategic Communications Plan,” available from report.
heritage.org/wm3348; Philip Ewing, Dod Buzz, “U.S. rolls out new
counter-terror comms plan,” September 9, 2011, available from
www.dodbuzz.com/2011/09/09/u-s-rolls-out-new-counter-terror-comms-plan/; Helle Dale, “U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Sticks and
Carrots,” Washington, DC: The Heritage Organization, September 15, 2011; Shaun Waterman, “Social networks used to counter al Qaeda: Team tries to impede jihadi recruiters,” Washington
Times, October 5, 2011, available from www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2011/oct/5/social-networks-used-to-counter-al-qaeda;
Camille
Elhassani, “US state department fights al-Qaeda in cyberspace,”
May 25, 2012, available from blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/Americas/usstate-department-fights-al-qaeda-cyberspace; Vivian Wagner, “US Cybercounterterrorism Team Takes on al-Qaida,” TechNewsWorld,
May 29, 2012, available from www.technewsworld.com/story/75238.
html; Judith McHale and Richard LeBaron, “Digitally dissuading
tomorrow’s terrorists,” available from dyn.politico.com. The CSCC,
though interagency, coordinates and is in direct communication
with the Counter Terrorism Bureau in the Department of State
(previously the Counter Terrorism Office, and Coordinator for
Counter Terrorism). See Organization of the Bureau of Counterterrorism, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Wash-
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ington, DC: U.S. Department of State, available from www.state.
gov/j/ct/about/index.htm; Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Al-Qaida after Bin Laden,” Remarks at the Jamestown Conference at the National Press
Club, Jamestown, VA, December 8, 2011, available from www.
state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2011/178499.htm; Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Countering
Violent Extremism,” Remarks at the Near East/South Asia Center
for Strategic Studies (NESA), Washington, DC: Near East/South
Asia Center for Strategic Studies, January 25, 2012, available from
www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/182716.htm; Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “The
State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism: Budget, Programs, and Policies,” Testimony before House Foreign Affairs
Committeee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Trade,” Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representations, April
18, 2012, available from www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188815.
htm; Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Bureau of Counterterrorism,
“Global Counterterrorism: A Progress Report,” Remarks, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, December 18, 2012, available
from www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/202179.htm.
173. For a brief discussion identifying these three bases of a
counteroffensive, see Omar Ashour, “Online De-Radicalization?
Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger,
and Media Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 4, No. 6, December 2010, pp. 15-19.
174. For Osama bin Ladin’s tactical propaganda during the
1994-2004 period, see especially, FBIS Report, Compilation of Usama bin Ladin Statements, 1994-January 2004, January 2004, available from www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf. For a recent
compilation that includes the above source but covers the time
frame 1991-2009 and also includes Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s propaganda, see Donald Holbrook, “Al-Qaeda Communiques by
Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri: A Chronology,” Alex P. Schmid, The
Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, London, UK, and New
York: Routledge, 2011/2013, “Appendix 4.3,” pp. 280-293.
175. For a very insightful analysis of this process of fabrications becoming signifiers and legends, and the means of preventing that, see Beatrice de Graaf, “Counter-Narratives and the
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Unrehearsed Stories Counter-Terrorists Unwittingly Produce,”
Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2009, pp. 5-11;
Froukje Demant and Beatrice De Graaf, “How to Counter Radical
Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33,
2010, pp. 408-428.
176. See, for example, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow,
“Framing Processes and Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 611-639.
177. This very accurately describes U.S. attempts, repeated
over many years both in public (i.e., the UN Security Council,
UN General Assembly), or in private communiques among State
Department embassy and intelligence officials, to prevent Osama
Bin Laden from using Taliban-controlled territory to issue declarations of war against America and Americans; train terrorists
targeting the U.S. homeland; and after the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the issuing of a federal indictment
(United States v. Usama bin Laden et al., S(2) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS)
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1998) to avoid extradition to the United States
to face the criminal justice system. See, for example, the following
UN Security Council Resolutions (S.C. Res. 1189 (1998), August
13, 1998; S.C. Res. 1193 (1998), August 28, 1998; S.C. Res.s 1214
(1998), December 8, 1998; S/1999/1021, October 4, 1999: “Letter
dated 1 October 1999 from the Deputy Permanent Representative
of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed
to the Secretary-General” S.C. Res. 1267 (1999), October 15 1999).
These contain explicit references to the Taliban as facilitating the
AQ terrorist sanctuary. There was unanimity on every resolution
listed above except for a single vote involving two abstentions.
Additional pre-9/11 resolutions include: S.C. Res. 1333 (2000),
December 19, 2000; S/2001/511, May 22, 2001, which includes
[1] “Letter dated 21 May from Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council.” [Re: Committee of Experts to
report on how arms embargo and terrorist training camp closure
would be monitored and enforced.] and, [2] “Letter dated May
18, 2001, from the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333
(2000) addressed to the Secretary-General,” whose “Enclosure” is:
“Report of the Committee of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Resolution 1333 (2000), para. 15 (a), regarding monitoring of
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the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan”; and
S.C. Res. 1363 (2001), July 30, 2001, the last pre-9/11 attempt to
have the Taliban extradite bin Laden, eliminate terrorist sanctuary, and end the flow of materials, weapons, and monies to AQ.
Further corroboration of the extensive efforts to which the USG
went during the period 1994-2001 to negotiate secretly with highlevel Taliban for extradition of Osama bin Laden and elimination
of terrorist sanctuaries, may be found at The National Security
Archive, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv. Here are two notable examples from among dozens of documents. Following the
USG launching of cruise missiles against Khost in Afghanistan
and Khartoum, Sudan in response to Bin Laden’s bombing of the
East African Embassies, on August 22, 1998, Mullah Omar called
a State Department official. (See www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB134/Doc%202.pdf.) The subject heading of this document:
“Afghanistan: Taliban’s Mullah Omar’s 8/22 Contact with State
Department.” A Summary of the 4-page Cable is furnished (capitalization in original):
TALIBAN SUPREME LEADER MULLAH OMAR TOLD
A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL IN WASHINGTON
THAT THE TALIBAN WAS OPEN TO THE SUGGESTION OF ESTABLISHING A VEHICLE FOR SECURE
COMMUNICATION WITH USG OFFICIALS, POSSIBLY
THROUGH AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD. WHILE OMAR
PARROTED SOME OF BIN LADEN’S HARD-LINE VIEWS,
HE LISTENED TO U.S. ARGUMENTS ON THE REASONS
FOR U.S. ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUDAN
AND THE REASONS WHY BIN LADEN’S CONTINUED
ACTIVITIES WERE NOT IN THE INTEREST OF THE
AFGHAN PEOPLE. OMAR WARNED THAT THE U.S.
STRIKES WOULD PROVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND
AROUSE ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS IN THE ISLAMIC
WORLD. WHILE HE WAS IN NO WAY THREATENING,
HE CLAIMED THE STRIKES COULD SPARK MORE TERRORIST ATTACKS. HE ASKED FOR EVIDENCE OF BIN
LADEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIONS.
END SUMMARY.

Though the above cable asserts that plenty of evidence exists of bin Laden’s terrorist activities, a follow-up cable on August
23, 1998, see www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/Doc
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%203.pdf, which provides the extensive, explicit case listing this
evidence, as well as other talking points to be used in follow-up
communication. The Subject of this embassy cable dated August
23, 1998, “Message to the Taliban on Bin Laden,” is summarized
in its first paragraph:
FOLLOWING UP ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR (REFTEL)
WHICH INDICATED AN APPARENT OPENNESS FOR
DIALOGUE, POST IS INSTRUCTED TO ENGAGE WITH
AN AUTHORITATIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TALIBAN TO EXPEL SAUDI TERRORIST OSAMA BIN LADEN
SO THAT HE CAN BE PROPERLY BROUGHT TO JUSTICE
FOR HIS TERRORIST ACTS. THE APPARENT READINESS
OF THE TALIBAN FOR SERIOUS DIALOGUE NEEDS TO
BE PROBED, WITH THE REALIZATION THAT IT COULD
TURN OUT TO BE A PLOY FOR RECOGNITION OR OTHER BENEFITS OR A DEVICE TO STALL FOR TIME.

For the legality of the U.S. use of force after 9/11 in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, see Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF), Public Law No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 2001; The UN
Charter, which according to Schmitt (Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, The Marshall
Center Papers, No. 5. Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: The
George Marshall Center, 2002, pp. iv + 98), “The Charter in limiting state behavior—Article 2(4)—also empowers states to defend
themselves, and this defense is not restricted to defense against
state actors (see esp. Article 39, and Article 51).” Was it legal?
Schmitt states: “No voices were raised [in the UN Council] claiming that either the customary right of self-defense or Article 51
was limited to the context of State actions” (p. 27). Also consider:
NATO’s invocation of Article V requiring collective self-defense,
the actions of most states, and the fact that “in no case, was there
any suggestion that the right was dependent on identifying a
State as the attacker” (Ibid.), and that post-October 7 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions “went so far as to urge
member States to ‘root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter
of the United Nations’” (p.27; see S.C. Res. 1378 (Nov. 14, 2002);
S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001; S.C. Res. 1390 (January 16, 2002); See
also S.C. Res. 1368 (September 12, 2001), S.C. Res. 1373 (September 28, 2001), and S.C. Res. 1377 (November 12, 2001).
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178. Above excerpts are translated from their Arabic book,
Islam and the Laws of War, which appeared in serial form in the
newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London, UK), August-September
2006; Translated and exerpted in MEMRI, “Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda,” available from www.memri.org/report/en/
print1887.htm.
179. This paraphrase of Isam al-Din Dirbalah, Istratijiyat wa
Tafjirat al-Qa’ida: al-Akhta wa al-Akhtar (The al-Qa’ida Organization’s
Strategy and Bombings: Mistakes and Rulings), Cairo, Egypt: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2003, appears in Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi,
“Part 1 of Book Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qaida’s Strategy,” available from www.opensource.gov; Original Arabic publication in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, Internet Version, January,
11, 2004.
180. See Ibid., for a more expansive discussion of these three
phases, presenting very illuminating insights into the Islamic
Group’s nuanced and objective analysis of U.S. vital interests and
policies. With respect to U.S. policies toward Israel and Arab and
Muslim issues, it states:
We should not disregard the role of the fundamentalist
Christian right in the United States that began to grow and
influence the internal and external trends of the Administration. An alliance emerged between the Jewish lobby and the
fundamentalist Christian right. The influence of this alliance
focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict and found a pretext to
meddle in the internal affairs of various countries, especially Muslim countries, under the slogan of ‘backing the
persecuted minorities in the world’.

The importance of the Islamic Group’s rejection of conspiracy
theories for explaining the present predicament confronting the
Arab and Muslim world is also telling. They state
The conspiracy theory truly means leaving one’s [free] will
so that only the will of the CIA and the Mossad prevail. Then
we blame our mistakes and apathy on the United States, the
Israeli conspiracy, and other states, as if we had no role in
everything that happened in this world.
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(See Najih Ibrahim, Egyptian Group shura council member’s
submitted conference paper, translated and reported in “Egypt:
Statement by Leading Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence
Initiative Strong,” available from www.opensource.gov, original in
Arabic, Al-Misri Al-Yawm, Cairo, July 2, 2007.)
181. Jihad—striving/struggling in the path of Allah to raise
Allah’s Word supreme—is classically understood to take five
forms: jihad of the heart/soul, designed to cleanse one of impure
intentions and thoughts (jihad bil nafs/qalb), jihad of the tongue
(jihad bil lisan), jihad of the pen/knowledge (jihad bil qalam/ilm),
jihad of the hand, i.e., commanding the good and forbidding the
bad through bodily reward and punishment (jihad bil yad), and
the most potentially life-threatening and therefore most regulated
of all, the jihad of the sword (jihad bis saif).
182. The words we use to describe AQ’s actions are key to
their legal and moral status in Islam. For an important contribution to leveraging Islamic law and morality to further marginalize
and criminalize AQ, see “Words that Work and Words that Don’t:
A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication,” Vol. 2, No. 10,
McLean, VA: National Counter Terrorism Center, Counterterrorism Communications Center, March 14, 2008, p. 14, available
from www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/127.pdf; Office
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims, Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, January 2008, available
from www.dhs.gov/terminology-define-terrorists-recommendationsamerican-muslims. The words we use to describe our “war” against
the AQ terrorist entity are also telling. For a remarkably wise and
prescient, early post-9/11 reflection by a noted military historian and theorist, see Michael Howard, Comment: “What’s in a
Name?: How to Fight Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2002 (based on a London lecture given October 30, 2001),
available from www.foreignaffairs.com/print/57615.
183. See Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda; Paul Kamolnick,
“Al Qaeda’s Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence
of Lawful Military Jihad” (for former Al Qaeda shari’a guide,
Sayyid Imam’s comprehensive fiqh-based critique of AQ’s doctrine of ‘killing in masse’); and Kamolnick, “The Egyptian Islamic
Group’s Critique of Al Qaeda’s Interpretation of Jihad.”
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184. Ibid.
185. For an examination of several key moral objections to terrorism, particularly its parasitic nature as a form of moral freeriding, see Paul Kamolnick, “Defending Liberal Democracy in an
Age of Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2012, Vol. 24, esp.
pp. 148-157.
186. Amaney A. Jamal, “It’s Not Who We Are, It’s What We
Do,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 5, September/October 2013,
pp. 152-154.
187. Ibid. p. 154.
188. See especially Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the
21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2006,
available from www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil; H. Richard
Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S.
Army War College Strategy Model,” J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.,
ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol.
I: Theory of War and Strategy, 5th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2012, pp. 45-51; Appendix I, “Guidelines for Strategy Formulation,” pp. 413-418, J.
Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy,
5th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, June 2012; Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Chap. 13: Toward an
Understanding of Military Strategy,” J. R. Cerami and J. F. Holcomb, Jr., eds., U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February
2001. pp. 179-185.
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